Copyright’s Private Ordering and the \u27Next Great Copyright Act\u27 by Rothman, Jennifer
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2014 
Copyright’s Private Ordering and the 'Next Great Copyright Act' 
Jennifer Rothman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Communication Technology and New Media Commons, Intellectual Property Law 
Commons, Internet Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Policy Design, Analysis, and Evaluation 
Commons, Science and Technology Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Policy Commons 
 
COPYRIGHT’S PRIVATE ORDERING AND THE 
“NEXT GREAT COPYRIGHT ACT” 
Jennifer E. Rothman† 
ABSTRACT 
Private ordering plays a significant role in the application of intellectual property laws, 
especially in the context of copyright law. In this Article, I highlight some of the dominant 
modes of private ordering and consider what formal copyright law should do, if anything, to 
engage with private ordering in the copyright space. I conclude that there is not one single 
approach that copyright law should take with regard to private ordering, but instead several 
different approaches. In some instances, the best option is for the law to get out of the way 
and simply continue to provide room for various approaches to flourish. In other contexts, 
the copyright statute should actively support private ordering efforts that may be jeopardized 
by the current regime. Private ordering may also highlight areas where the law is in need of 
reform. This is perhaps most noticeable in the context of fair use which has led to the 
proliferation of much of the private ordering. The combination of the unpredictability and 
expense of fair use litigation combined with potentially high statutory damages has created a 
series of risk-averse litigation-avoidance practices and an underutilization of fair use. 
Legislation may be necessary to prevent a lock-in effect of some of these industry practices 
and norms. In particular, courts should be barred from using these customs to set the 
boundaries of fair use. Revisions to the Copyright Act could also address some of the 
uncertainty surrounding fair use and facilitate the use of works in instances that we would 
like to encourage. In recent years, copyright holders have used technology and contracts to 
greatly limit what users can do with copyrighted works and even with uncopyrightable 
elements of those works. Revisions to copyright law should engage with these private efforts 
and protect a significant fair use zone. Copyright’s private ordering also reveals some areas 
of agreement which merit codification, such as faculty ownership of course materials and 
scholarship. Copyright law does not operate in a vacuum and any major revisions to 
copyright law must take into consideration the practices that have developed in its wake. As 
we look forward to a Copyright Act for the twenty-first century, Congress must not only 
consider ways to limit online piracy, but also how to protect the public’s vital space to 
engage with, comment on, and rework copyrighted material in light of the myriad practices 
that have developed in the shadow of the 1976 Act.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 4, 2013, the current Register of Copyrights, Maria Pallante, 
called for the “next great copyright act.”1 Congress has followed her lead, 
calling for and conducting a number of hearings on what reforms might be 
appropriate for our now-aging Copyright Act.2 This major review of 
copyright law must include consideration of private-sector activities in the 
copyright sphere. These privately generated rules have operated both to 
expand and to limit copyright in various ways without the opportunity for 
the public to debate or participate in these governing regimes.  
The last major overhaul of U.S. copyright law culminated in the passage 
of the 1976 Copyright Act.3 Since 1976, changing technology—particularly 
the digital revolution—has radically altered the copyright landscape.4 A 
variety of piecemeal additions to the Act have tried to address some of these 
and other challenges for copyright law.5 Unfortunately, these Band-Aids for 
outdated aspects of copyright law have made the law more byzantine, 
obsolete, and draconian,6 without actually fixing many of the issues raised by 
the digital revolution. In part in reaction to these challenges for copyright 
 
 1. See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315 
(2013); see also 159 CONG. REC. D253-01 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2013) (Pallante’s speech before 
Congress). 
 2. See, e.g., A Case Study in Consensus Building: The Copyright Principles Project: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop. and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th 
Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Prof. Pamela Samuelson), available at http://judiciary.house 
.gov/_files/hearings/113th/05162013/Samuelson%20Testimony%20051613.pdf; The Scope 
of Fair Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2014), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/ 
hearings?ID=8E18A9AA-1AA4-4D7C-8EBF-0284862EC44B. 
 3. For an excellent discussion of the history of the passage of the 1976 Act, see Jessica 
D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987). 
 4. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, 
CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 1 (2013) [hereinafter DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE] (“[A]rguably no prior technological change has impacted copyright with a 
magnitude comparable to the development of the Internet.”).  
 5. Some of these changes include the passage of the Digital Audio Home Recording 
Act of 1992 and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in 1998.  
 6. See Jennifer E. Rothman, E-Sports as a Prism for the Role of Evolving Technology in 
Intellectual Property, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 317, 318, 328–29 (2013) (discussing the 
challenges wrought by technology-specific legislation); Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary 
Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 551, 551 (2007) (criticizing the law’s current 
length, complexity, and incomprehensibility); David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright 
Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1237–39, 1307–44 , 1374–78, 1381–83 (2004) 
(describing the many Congressional missteps in copyright law since the passage of the 1976 
Act). 
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law, private ordering has proliferated in industries that frequently use or 
create copyrighted works. Such private ordering has included various forms 
of custom, such as industry practices, agreements, guidelines, and community 
norms, as well as contracts and technology that alter how copyrighted works 
can be used.7 These efforts by private parties have sometimes worked in 
harmony with the public law, but at other times at cross-purposes with it. 
The public must be given the opportunity to weigh in on these private efforts 
as part of any study of today’s copyright law and Congress must consider the 
role of private ordering. The Department of Commerce and the Copyright 
Office are increasingly acknowledging some aspects of private ordering in the 
copyright sphere.8 Thus far, however, the government has not engaged in a 
robust analysis of the role of private ordering. Such an analysis is crucial in 
the upcoming process of revising our copyright laws. This Article provides 
an overview of the dominant modes of private ordering in the copyright 
context and makes some preliminary suggestions about possible statutory 
revisions that could both support the development of such private 
approaches and rein in some of their excesses.  
Much of the private ordering has developed to address uncertainties or 
failings of the current law, while other aspects of such ordering have sought 
to provide alternatives for those who seek something different than what the 
basic defaults of copyright offer. There is therefore not one single approach 
that formal copyright law should take with regard to private ordering. In 
some instances, the best option is for the law to get out of the way and leave 
room for a variety of private approaches to flourish. This relatively hands-off 
approach has been the dominant mode of formal law to date and has allowed 
various communities to best tailor copyright law to their needs. In some 
contexts, however, formal law needs to engage more fully with private 
ordering. In some instances, the law needs to step in to prevent a lock-in 
effect of various problematic industry practices and norms that are altering 
the boundaries of copyright law without the appropriate public debate and 
 
 7. The term “custom” has been used in the law to “mean many different things, from 
regularly occurring industry practices, to social norms, to ongoing practices that have existed 
from time immemorial.” Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual 
Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 1900 n.1 (2007). Despite their differences, all customs share the 
common characteristic of being rules developed outside the legal system by communities or 
industries that have extra-judicial enforcement mechanisms. I have previously explored how 
custom affects the way copyrighted works are used as a de facto matter and also how custom 
influences courts’ evaluations in individual copyright cases. See id. at 1909–46. 
 8. See, e.g., Pallante, supra note 1, at 326 n.65 (pointing to industry agreements that 
facilitate the enforcement of copyright online); DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 22–23 
(noting the increasing use of fair use guidelines, but encouraging parties to work with a 
diverse set of participants to develop such guidelines). 
2014] COPYRIGHT’S PRIVATE ORDERING 1599 
legislative adoption. The Copyright Act also may need to actively support 
some private ordering that is jeopardized by the current regime.  
Part II of the Article considers the risk-averse licensing practices that 
have dominated the creative industries and how revisions to copyright law 
could limit the negative impact of such customs and even counteract the 
pressures that feed this clearance culture. Part III evaluates the recent 
proliferation of guidelines and best-practices codes and statements intended 
to address the uncertain boundaries of fair use. Revisions to the Copyright 
Act should allow the continued development of such guidelines, but must 
also clearly indicate that these guidelines do not alter the boundaries of fair 
use.  
Part IV considers the use of alternative regimes that are layered on top of 
the existing copyright structure. I focus here on the most prominent example 
of such an approach—Creative Commons—a nonprofit organization that 
provides standardized licensing contracts that alter the default restrictions of 
copyright. In this Part, I suggest ways that formal law can facilitate the use of 
such individualized approaches.  
In Part V, I discuss the last major form of private ordering—the 
increasing use of contracts and technology by content providers to limit user 
rights far beyond what the law requires. Absent legislative intervention, these 
private efforts may make fair use largely irrelevant to most consumers. To 
counteract this effect, I recommend adding an express statutory provision 
requiring that contracts related to the use of copyrighted works and 
technology used for copyright enforcement must maintain a significant fair 
use zone.  
Finally, in Part VI, I suggest some preliminary ideas for possible changes 
to the Copyright Act informed by copyright’s private ordering. Some 
industry customs reveal areas of consensus that might merit greater stability 
through codification, such as faculty ownership of course materials and 
scholarship. Private ordering also highlights areas where the law generally 
needs revision. For example, much of the private ordering is driven by the 
unpredictability and expense of fair use litigation. A variety of reforms could 
provide greater support to those who wish to use others’ copyrighted works 
without permission in contexts that we would like to facilitate.  
II. THE CLEARANCE CULTURE AND THE ROLE OF 
CUSTOMARY LICENSING PRACTICES 
One dominant mode of private ordering in the copyright arena is the 
pervasive licensing of copyrighted works even when such licensing is 
unnecessary. In prior work, I have dubbed these practices of licensing or 
removing almost all copyrighted works from new works “litigation-avoidance 
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customs.”9 These litigation-avoidance customs form a “clearance culture” in 
which the default approach is to clear everything without regard to whether 
the uses would have otherwise been lawful.10  
These clearance practices are firmly entrenched in all media, including 
film, television, music, the fine arts, and publishing.11 Many book publishers, 
movie and television studios, distributors, insurers, and other gatekeepers in 
various copyright fields err on the side of licensing all third-party content.12 If 
licensing is not feasible, they often demand the removal of third-party 
material.13 Many of the intended uses would likely be fair ones if litigated (to 
the extent one can accurately predict such things).14 Nevertheless, legal 
counsel make reasonable calculations that in most instances it will be cheaper 
and easier to license works than to risk uncertain and expensive litigation. 
The current median cost of copyright litigation beyond the discovery stage 
ranges from $300,000 to just under $1.625 million (depending on the amount 
at risk).15  
Not only does the cost of litigation itself often outweigh alternative 
arrangements between parties, but the consequences of losing in court are 
substantial. Even if no actual damages are caused by the use of a plaintiff’s 
work, statutory damages for copyright cases can be massive.16 Additionally, 
attorney’s fees can be awarded to the prevailing party, so a loss can mean 
 
 9. Rothman, supra note 7, at 1909–24, 1951–53. In other instances, licensing is driven 
by “relationship-preservation” because the parties have ongoing relationships with the 
owners of the relevant copyrighted works and do not wish to cause conflicts that will have 
future ill effects on business dealings. Id. at 1949, 1951–53 (drawing on the work of Lisa 
Bernstein in the context of contract law). I will focus here only on the prevalent litigation-
avoidance customs, though relationship-preserving licensing undoubtedly adds to the overall 
clearance culture. 
 10. Rothman, supra note 7, at 1911–16; PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, 
UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR 
DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 22 (2004), available at http://www.cmsimpact.org/ 
sites/default/files/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf (defining the “clearance culture” as 
“the shared set of expectations that all rights must always be cleared”). Others have also 
used this term. See, e.g., MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? 
FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 5 (2005), available at 
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf; cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN 
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY passim (2004) (comparing the current lock-down 
culture with his ideal “free culture”).  
 11. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 1911–16. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013, 
at 36 (2013). 
 16. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012). 
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paying legal fees that significantly exceed damages, statutory or otherwise.17 
The threat of injunctive relief also looms large because if granted, such relief 
can destroy the chance of recovering the initial investment in a project. This 
risk is particularly great in the motion picture industry because the upfront 
investment costs are substantial. Criminal liability also encourages parties to 
err on the side of licensing, especially given that a breach of the dominant 
licensing practices may expose a party to being found a willful infringer 
subject to penalties that include prison time and additional fines.18 
A. FEAR OF GAMBLING ON FAIR USE 
Much of the pressure to adopt these clearance practices derives from 
uncertainty as to the boundaries of copyright’s fair use defense. The fair use 
defense permits uses of another’s copyrighted work without permission or 
payment in some circumstances. The fairness of a particular use is primarily 
determined by considering four factors set forth in § 107 of the Copyright 
Act.19 Section 107 provides that:  
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by 
reproduction in copies or phonorecords . . . for purposes such as 
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of 
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted 
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of 
the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.20 
The fair use doctrine can be difficult to apply in the real world. Average 
citizens have trouble evaluating what uses they can make of others’ works 
and even experienced copyright attorneys note the unpredictability of fair use 
 
 17. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
 18. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (2012) (exposing those who willfully infringe copyrights for 
commercial advantage to up to ten years in prison and additional financial penalties); Richard 
Feiner & Co. v. Passport Int’l Prods., No. 97-Civ-9144(RO), 1998 WL 437157, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1998) (finding that copyright infringement was willful because the use of 
unlicensed film clips contravened industry clearance practices); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2319 
(2014) (setting forth additional criminal penalties for violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506). 
 19. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
(setting forth the common law fair use doctrine).  
 20. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
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determinations. Scholars and courts have long described the fair use doctrine 
as “murky,” “unpredictable” and “ad hoc.”21  
Several recent works have challenged these dire assessments of fair use.22 
Michael Madison, for example, has noted numerous “patterns” or categories 
of preferred uses—ones more likely to be found fair.23 These categories 
include journalism, parody, and criticism.24 According to Professor Madison, 
if a user conforms to the practices of a particular pattern of use, the use is 
likely to be found fair.25 Pamela Samuelson has similarly claimed that 
“copyright fair use caselaw is more coherent and more predictable than many 
commentators seem to believe.”26 Like Madison, Professor Samuelson 
describes “clusters” of uses that are more likely to be held fair.27 Her 
categories include expressive uses, such as transformative or productive ones 
(e.g., parodies or critical commentaries), authorship-promoting uses, uses that 
promote learning, and foreseeable uses (e.g., personal uses and uses in 
litigation).28 Matthew Sag’s recent empirical analysis of fair use cases supports 
Madison’s and Samuelson’s contention that fair use is more predictable than 
is often claimed.29 Professor Sag points to the strong likelihood of succeeding 
on a fair use defense when a use is transformative and copies only part of the 
underlying work.30 
 Although I agree that there are broad categories and patterns of uses 
more likely (or even likely) to be found fair, these broad assessments do not 
provide sufficient security for users in individual cases. There is a big 
difference between knowing that given categories of uses tend to be favored 
for fair use—e.g., uses in news or education—and knowing how a particular 
case will turn out. Moreover, in the gray areas (and even outside them) the 
case law is littered with overturned assessments of fair use and cases that 
 
 21. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); WILLIAM F. 
PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE §§ 3:89, 9:33 (2d ed. 1995); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use 
Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105–06 (1990); Lloyd Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on 
the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1137–38 (1990). 
 22. Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012); Pamela Samuelson, 
Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-
Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004). 
 23. See generally Madison, supra note 22. 
 24. Id. at 1645–64. 
 25. Id. at 1622–64. 
 26. Samuelson, supra note 22, at 2537. 
 27. Id. at 2541 & passim. 
 28. Id. at 2546–2614. 
 29. Sag, supra note 22, at 79–81 
 30. Id. 
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point in different directions.31 Major content-industry players therefore 
unsurprisingly often prefer to license, given the risks associated with asserting 
a fair use claim, even when they know the use at issue falls into one of the 
preferred categories. 
The Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. case is emblematic of why litigating 
fair use is not a preferred business model in the content industries.32 Campbell 
is most often cited for its shift in focus in fair use determinations to the 
question of transformativeness. This approach, which has been universally 
adopted, adds a consideration to the first fair use factor that evaluates the 
purpose and character of a defendant’s use. Courts now consider whether the 
use changes or alters the original work to such an extent that the work is 
“transformed.”33  
Despite this dominant narrative of Campbell, the case is also an object 
lesson on why parties prefer to license even if they think they could 
eventually prevail on a fair use determination in the courts. Campbell involved 
the claim that the song, Pretty Woman, by the rap group 2 Live Crew infringed 
Oh, Pretty Woman, a song recorded and written by Roy Orbison. A district 
court in Tennessee held 2 Live Crew’s use of Orbison’s song fair.34 The Sixth 
Circuit, however, reversed, concluding that the use was not fair primarily 
because it was commercial, took the heart of the underlying work, and likely 
damaged the market for derivatives of the song.35 The Supreme Court 
 
 31. See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’g 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that many of the artist’s uses of defendant’s photographs were 
fair); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001), rev’g 136 
F. Supp. 2d 1357 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (holding that the novel The Wind Done Gone could be a fair 
use of Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With the Wind ); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 
(2d Cir. 1987), rev’g 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that uses of excerpts and 
paraphrases of J.D. Salinger’s letters in a biography about the famous author were not fair 
use). Compare, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(reversing the district court and rejecting a fair use defense when a poster appeared for less 
than thirty seconds in the background of a scene in a television sitcom), with, e.g., Amsinck v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the use of a 
copyrighted mobile in a film was fair even though it was sometimes shown in close-up and 
appeared on screen for over one and a half minutes), and Gottlieb Dev. L.L.C. v. Paramount 
Pics. Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 625 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that the use of a copyrighted 
pinball machine in the background of a film was not infringing).  
 32. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 33. There is a consensus that after Campbell, fair use defenses became easier to win, at 
least if one could show that the underlying work was sufficiently “transformed.” See Jennifer 
E. Rothman, Sex Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property, 23 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 149 
(2012). 
 34. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1153–58 (M.D. Tenn. 
1991) (finding fair use primarily on the basis that it was a parody that would not directly 
injure the market for the original and that would have been unlikely to receive a license). 
 35. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1434–39 (6th Cir. 1992).  
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granted certiorari on the fair use question and reversed the Sixth Circuit. The 
Court held that the commerciality of the use was not dispositive and that the 
lower courts should consider the transformativeness of the use in addition to 
the song’s commercial status when evaluating the first fair use factor—the 
purpose and character of the use.36  
Although the use in Campbell is often referred to as a fair one and the 
case as a “win” for the defendant, this is not true. The Supreme Court did 
not end the fair use litigation with its decision, but instead remanded for 
further fact finding on the market harm factor.37 The song had generated 
significant revenue for Acuff-Rose (the holder of Orbison’s copyright) not 
only from the initial recording, but also from the licensing of covers and 
other derivative works. The district court was instructed to consider whether 
the use by 2 Live Crew would harm these markets and then to weigh that 
harm with the other fair use factors.  
Two years after the Supreme Court decision the case settled without a final 
determination of fair use. As part of the agreement, 2 Live Crew paid a licensing 
fee to Acuff-Rose.38 Although the amount of the license is not public, there is 
no question that it would have been cheaper to just pay a licensing fee at the 
outset before the massive attorneys’ fees accrued.39 2 Live Crew’s victory was 
a Pyrrhic one. Thus, rather than solidify future assertions of fair use, Campbell 
reinforces the preference to license or remove material whenever possible. 
Even if one had predicted, reasonably, at the outset that the use was fair, the 
cost of litigating the case to the Supreme Court likely far exceeded the cost of 
the license—if obtainable—and perhaps even the value to the defendant of 
doing the parody in the first place. If the attorneys had known the path 
Campbell would take, they might have suggested that the record label not 
release the song.40 
The path of Campbell is hardly an isolated instance of courts going back 
and forth on fair use determinations. The case law is littered with such 
examples. I will highlight two recent examples. In Cariou v. Prince, the Second 
Circuit recently reversed (in part) the district court’s determination that the 
uses of the plaintiff’s photographs in artworks by appropriation art 
 
 36. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79. 
 37. Id. at 593–94. 
 38. Acuff-Rose Settles Suit with Rap Group, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, June 5, 1996, 
at A14. 
 39. Cf. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(noting that it is “cheaper to license than to litigate” fair use).  
 40. This possible trajectory was not entirely lost on the record label, which had initially 
sought a license for the Orbison song, but was denied one by Acuff-Rose. Campbell, 510 U.S. 
at 572–73. 
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phenomenon Richard Prince were infringing. The Second Circuit held most 
of the uses fair because they were transformative.41 Notably, the court agreed 
with the district court with regard to at least five of the photographs, 
concluding that these were not sufficiently transformative to hold the uses 
fair as a matter of law.42 The court remanded the case back to the district 
court for an evaluation of fair use on these allegedly infringing artworks.43 
Like Campbell, the case then settled.44 Each party paid their own (likely 
substantial) attorneys’ fees.45 It is not clear whether Prince paid a licensing 
fee, because the terms of the agreement to settle have not been disclosed.46  
A similar litigation history can be seen in the Margaret Mitchell estate’s 
efforts to stop Alice Randall’s unauthorized alternative version of Gone with 
the Wind, told from the slaves’ point of view. Randall’s The Wind Done Gone 
was held infringing by a district court. The Eleventh Circuit then reversed 
and held that the use’s transformativeness weighed in favor of fair use.47 As 
in Campbell and Cariou, the appeal did not end the fair use litigation; instead, 
the case was remanded for further fact-finding.48 Randall’s publisher, 
Houghton Mifflin, then settled the case and agreed to pay a licensing fee to 
the Mitchell estate for the use—with the caveat that the fee would go to 
Morehouse College rather than directly to the Mitchell estate. The publisher 
also agreed to clearly label Randall’s book as an “unauthorized parody.”49  
Given these commonplace reversals, conflicting decisions on similar 
uses, and the reality that many of these so-called victories for fair use were in 
fact resolved by paying licensing fees and substantial attorneys’ fees, it 
remains a smart business decision to license whenever possible. Even though 
fair use may be more predictable (and generous) than some have feared, it 
still does not provide sufficient reliability, predictability, or efficiency to 
incentivize assertions of fair use. The dominant clearance culture therefore 
largely remains in place.50  
 
 41. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705–12 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 42. Id. at 710–11. 
 43. Id. at 712. 
 44. Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, Cariou v. Prince, No. 08-CIV.11327, at *1 (filed 
on March 19, 2014). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Jan Wolfe, Cariou, Viacom Copyright Suits Settlements, 30 ENT. LAW & FIN. 
NEWSLETTER (ALM Media Props., New York, N.Y.), Apr. 1, 2014, at 5. 
 47. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 48. Id. at 1275–77. 
 49. David Mehegan, Settlement Lets ‘Gone With the Wind’ Parody Live On, BOSTON 
GLOBE, May 10, 2002, at C4. 
 50. Rothman, supra note 7, at 1911–16; Jennifer E. Rothman, Best Intentions: Reconsidering 
Best Practices Statements in the Context of Fair Use and Copyright Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 371, 
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B. JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON LITIGATION-AVOIDANCE CUSTOMS 
These individual risk-averse decisions to license or remove material 
negatively affect what sorts of creative works get made and their content. In 
the context of potential revisions to copyright law, the bigger concern is not 
the societal losses caused by these individual creative alterations, but instead 
courts’ willingness to consider such practices as evidence of what sorts of 
uses are fair. In numerous instances, courts have looked at clearance-culture 
licensing practices as evidence that a particular use is unfair because it 
contravenes the industry custom to license those types of uses. 
Courts consider both actual and potential licensing markets when 
evaluating two of the fair use factors. The first fair use factor considers the 
“purpose and character of the use.”51 As part of this inquiry, courts 
determine whether a use is commercial in nature. The failure to license a 
work when it is customary to do so has been viewed as evidence that a use is 
commercial in nature—a determination that weighs against fair use.  
The consideration of licensing practices to determine if a use is 
commercial stems in large part from the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper 
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, Inc.52 In Harper & Row, the Court 
explained that: “The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether 
the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether the user stands to 
profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
customary price.”53 The customary price is determined by what others are 
paying to use a work. The tendency to license works to avoid litigation costs 
and the unpredictability of fair use establishes a “customary price.” When a 
defendant is found to have not paid this “customary price,” the defendant’s 
use is often held unfair.54  
 
375 (2010). In Section III.B, I discuss some successes in pushing back against these 
practices.  
 51. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 52. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 53. Id. at 562 (citing Roy Export Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 
F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][1] (1984)) (emphasis added).  
 54. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–02, 804 n.19 
(6th Cir. 2005) (questioning the availability of a fair use defense for the unlicensed sampling 
of another’s song in an industry where most companies and artists “sought licenses as a 
matter of course”); Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 166–68, 176 (2d Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
the fair use defense for incidental display of sunglasses in advertisement when the defendant 
failed to pay the customary price for use of a copyrighted design); Ringgold v. Black Entm’t 
Television, 126 F.3d 70, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting the fair use defense when the 
defendant did not follow industry custom of clearing background scenery used in a television 
show); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385–88 (6th Cir. 
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Courts also consider licensing practices when analyzing the fourth fair 
use factor. This factor evaluates the effect of the use on the market for the 
work or the work’s underlying value.55 When there is a general industry 
practice to license copyrighted works in a particular context and a defendant 
fails to do so, courts point to the existence of an overall licensing market as 
evidence that a defendant’s failure to license causes or will cause market 
harm.56 Taken together, these litigation-avoidance customs, driven by 
reasonable business calculations, have a multiplier effect that makes it 
difficult to successfully assert a fair use defense when risk-averse licensing is 
common.  
One of the clearest examples of courts’ reliance on customary licensing 
practices is the Second Circuit’s decision in Ringgold v. Black Entertainment 
Television.57 In Ringgold, Black Entertainment Television (“BET”) used a poster 
of the plaintiff’s artwork in the background set-dressing of its television 
sitcom, ROC. BET was assumed to have lawfully purchased the poster after 
deciding that it would be an appropriate piece of art for the scene.58 The 
poster was visible for less than thirty seconds, was never the focal point of 
 
1996) (rejecting the fair use defense when the defendant did not follow the industry custom 
of licensing coursepack materials); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 
926–27, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting the fair use defense when a private corporation did 
not follow the industry practice of licensing); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel 
Enters., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1, 47–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting the fair use defense when the 
defendants failed to license footage used in a promotional clip in contravention of the 
industry practice to license such clips); Richard Feiner & Co., Inc. v. Passport Int’l Prods., 
Inc., No. 97 Civ. 9144(RO), 1998 WL 437157, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1998) (finding 
defendants’ failure to license film trailers reckless because “defendants are not amateurs in 
video production” and it was film “industry practice to license trailers for exhibition”); cf. 
Triangle Publ’ns v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that the use of plaintiff’s copyrighted magazine cover was fair use, in part because the 
advertising industry routinely follows a practice of using copyrighted works in comparative 
ads); Frank Schaffer Publ’ns v. The Lyons P’ship, L.P., 10 Ent. L. Rep. 9, 13 (C.D. Cal. 
1993) (holding that use was fair where no license was sought, in part because the “customary 
price for the inclusion of [the plaintiff’s posters in the defendant’s show’s set] is gratis”). 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  
 56. See, e.g., Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens, Ltd., 619 F.3d 301, 308–13 (4th Cir. 2010); 
Davis, 246 F.3d at 166–68, 176; L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 
987, 994–95 (9th Cir. 1998); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122–
23 (9th Cir. 1997); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 80–81; Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1385–86; Am. 
Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 926–27; Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311–12 (2d Cir. 1992); 
Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1048–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); 
Frank Schaffer Publ’ns v. The Lyons P’ship, L.P., 15 Ent. L. Rep. 9 (C.D. Cal. 1993); Basic 
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 57. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (reversing a district 
court decision that the use was fair). 
 58. Id. at 71–72. The network itself likely did not concern itself with the poster, but the 
production designer or set dresser likely chose it on behalf of the production. 
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any shot, and was not referred to in the dialogue.59 Nevertheless, the court 
rejected a fair use defense in large part because of the failure to conform with 
the industry practice of licensing copyrighted works used as set-dressing.60 
The court concluded that BET failed to pay the “customary price” for using 
Ringgold’s work because it did not license her artwork.61 In so holding, the 
Second Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of fair use. 
Not only do such fair use decisions problematically reject the defense in 
instances in which it should be found, but they also further skew licensing 
practices and exacerbate the under-assertion of fair use. When courts 
consider licensing evidence, parties are more likely to license, which makes 
courts more likely to once again rely on licensing evidence.62 The end result is 
doctrinal feedback which exacerbates the incorporation of these risk-averse, 
but customary practices.63 Small acts of litigation-avoidance can lead to a 
cascade of risk-averse practices that ultimately set the fair use standard 
without courts ever engaging in an independent fair use analysis.  
A prime example of this is the licensing practices that developed in 
response to the settlement of a complaint filed against New York University 
(“NYU”) involving the copying of works for educational uses. The lawsuit by 
publishers against the university alleged that the copying of works for use in 
classroom materials infringed various copyrights. Rather than litigate the 
 
 59. Id. at 72–74. 
 60. Id. at 79–80. The court cited an amicus brief filed by the Artists Rights Society and 
the Picasso estate that listed numerous examples of other shows and films that licensed 
artwork in similar circumstances. See id.; see also Brief for Artists Rights Society as Amici 
Curiae, Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) (No. 96-9329).  
 61. Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)). 
 62. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1397 (6th Cir. 
1996) (Merritt, J., dissenting); id. at 1400–04, 1407–10 (Ryan, J., dissenting); Am. 
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17, 931 (2d Cir. 1994); id. at 936–39 
(Jacobs, J., dissenting); Hofheinz v. A&E Television Networks, 146 F. Supp. 2d. 442, 
448–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., Inc., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 140 
(E.D.N.Y. 2001); Rothman, supra note 7, at 1933–34; James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights 
Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 885–906 (2007); Lydia Pallas Loren, 
Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38–47 (1997); Matthew Africa, Comment, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence 
in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 
1145–64 (2000). 
 63. Gibson, supra note 62, at 884–86 & passim; cf. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and 
Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1717–18 (1996); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A 
Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 
992, 994 (1992); Abhiji V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797, 798 
(1992). 
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case, NYU settled.64 This settlement led many other universities and copy 
stores to license material used in course readers and handouts, even though 
there was no governing case law on these uses.65 When the less risk-averse 
entities then claimed the uses were fair, courts cited the licensing that 
followed the NYU settlement as a basis for denying fair use defenses in 
similar contexts. In the first court decision to litigate the fair use question, 
Basic Books v. Kinko’s, a court held that it was not a fair use to copy articles 
and other materials for the classroom in part because of the customary 
practice of licensing such uses.66 After this single court decision on the issue, 
most holdouts started licensing materials.67 When subsequent challenges were 
made to the fair use evaluation in Basic Books, courts pointed again to the 
now-even-more-prevalent licensing practices as a basis for rejecting a fair use 
defense in the context of course packets.68 It may be appropriate to license 
articles and other materials routinely used in an educational context,69 
particularly if the educational market is the primary market for the underlying 
work, but the fact that such licensing is customary should have little 
relevance for determining fair use. I will discuss the appropriate role for 
evidence of licensing in the next section.  
C. DISRUPTING THE CLEARANCE CULTURE 
Any revision to the Copyright Act must address the courts’ reliance on 
litigation-avoidance licensing customs. Even though not all courts have gone 
down this problematic path, enough have that this line of cases must be 
overruled by statute. The Copyright Act should clarify that such industry 
 
 64. Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82 Civ. 8333, 1983 WL 1134, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983). 
 65. See Steven J. Melamut, Pursuing Fair Use, Law Libraries and Electronic Reserves, 92 LAW 
LIBR. J. 157, 182 (2000); Bernard Zidar, Fair Use and the Code of the Schoolyard: Can Copyshops 
Compile Coursepacks Consistent with Copyright?, 46 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1377 (1997) (citing 
KENNETH D. CREWS, COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE, AND THE CHALLENGE FOR UNIVERSITIES 45 
(1993)). 
 66. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 67. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 (6th Cir. 
1996); Rothman, supra note 7, at 1920–21, 1954–55. 
 68. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1384–88 (pointing to dominant licensing 
practices in fair use analysis to find commercial purpose and likely market harm); cf. 
Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82 Civ. 8333, 1983 WL 1134 (S.D.N.Y. May 
31, 1983) (Order and Final Judgment) (providing the terms of the NYU settlement). 
 69.  Cf. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012) 
(holding some educational uses not fair because of available licensing), rev’d on other grounds, 
Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). After the substantive 
editing of this Article was complete, the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in Patton. The 
appellate decision agreed with the relevance of available licensing markets in the educational 
context.  See id. at 1275–81. 
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clearance practices should be discounted. Given the strong impetus to 
remove uncleared works or license works regardless of the likely viability or 
appropriateness of a fair use defense, the mere existence of such practices 
provides limited information about the fairness of the particular use. The fact 
that licensing markets exist should not weigh against fair use simply because 
licensing is common practice.  
Some scholars do not share my concerns about using customary licensing 
as a proxy for fair use. In particular, Richard Epstein, while acknowledging 
many areas of agreement with my analysis, suggests that common licensing 
practices may be indicative of appropriate fair use boundaries.70 Although he 
thinks bullying by copyright holders and the ensuing litigation avoidance by 
“frightened” users should not be considered in fair use analysis, he contends 
that most other clearance-culture practices are more deserving of deference.71 
In the context of Ringgold, for example, he thinks that the customary licensing 
may reflect the appropriateness of licensing background artwork.72 For him, 
the workability of such a licensing regime suggests that the markets may be 
working well in this regard because these practices may allow parties to 
access works for use in scenes (at reasonable rates), while at the same time 
facilitating payments to creators for uses of their works.73  
This apparent win-win, however, frames fair use primarily through a 
market failure lens.74 Some have suggested that if licensing is possible, all 
works should be licensed.75 However, fair use has never been, and should 
never be, “fared use.”76 Courts do not require a defendant to demonstrate 
that a plaintiff would not have been willing to license at a reasonable fee 
before finding a fair use. Nor should a custom of not licensing such works 
definitively establish the contrary—that such uses are fair. Fair use means 
 
 70. Richard A. Epstein, Some Reflection on Custom in the IP Universe, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 
223 (2008) (responding to my work). 
 71. Id. at 224–25. 
 72. Id. at 225–27. 
 73. Id.  
 74. For a fuller response to Richard Epstein, see Jennifer E. Rothman, Why Custom 
Cannot Save Copyright’s Fair Use Defense, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 243 (2008). 
 75. See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 188–216 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 
1614 & passim (1982) (advocating a test for fair use that requires a demonstration of “market 
failure”). I note that Professor Gordon in other work has suggested that copyright should be 
limited either in scope or by the First Amendment in ways that exceed this market failure 
analysis. See Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in 
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993). 
 76. Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. 
REV. 463, 569 (2010). 
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more than simple market failure.77 Regardless of whether reasonable licensing 
rates are available, not all uses of another’s copyrighted works should be by 
permission or payment only. If in every instance where a license could be 
purchased, but is not, a court concludes that the “customary price” is not 
paid, and rejects a fair use, fair use will be dramatically narrowed.  
Consider the fact that individual songs can now be purchased on iTunes 
and other services for ninety-nine cents. If this fee is considered the 
customary price, because people customarily pay the ninety-nine cents, then 
are all uses of songs without paying this fee unfair? Under the customary-
price language, yes—even if a song is exchanged among close friends or 
family, used as background music for a classroom project, or displayed in 
slides by a copyright professor making a point. Even if there were a 
mechanism for easily paying for a license for such uses at reasonable rates, it 
is not appropriate to require payment in each of these instances. Consider a 
use in a slightly different context. Suppose that a documentary filmmaker 
wishes to include (without blurring the image or text) a poster of the hit boy 
band One Direction that one of his subjects has up on her bedroom wall. 
Why should One Direction or the holder of the copyright in the image 
receive any compensation for the appearance of posters that were lawfully 
purchased and actually hung in the documentary subject’s room? Even if the 
filmmaker could obtain a reasonably priced license to display the poster in 
her movie, he should not have to ask anyone’s permission or pay any fee to 
document his subject’s reality. There are many instances in which the 
freedom of expression and association, and the rights of privacy and liberty 
demand that uses be permissible regardless of the functioning of licensing 
markets.78 
The foregoing analysis does not mean that evidence about licensing is 
wholly irrelevant. The availability and ease of licensing is a relevant and 
useful inquiry in fair use. Evidence of frequent licensing can demonstrate the 
feasibility of licensing in a particular context and weigh against a finding of 
fair use. The key question, however, should be whether there is a reasonable 
and appropriate mechanism for obtaining the copyrighted work at a 
reasonable price in the required form, not the frequency (or infrequency) of 
licensing.  
 
 77. See id. at 528–29, 532–33.  
 78. For a more in-depth discussion of some of these uses, see generally Rothman, supra 
note 76, in which I describe uses that should be protected under a liberty-based analysis. 
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This distinction is highlighted in the recent Cambridge Press v. Becker 
district-court decision.79 In Becker, the court evaluated a fair use defense by 
Georgia State University for electronically copying and distributing works (or 
parts of those works) for use in online reserves accessible to students.80 The 
court held that the fair use determination depended in large part on whether 
there was an easy way of getting an electronic copy of the required article or 
book chapter at a reasonable fee.81 When digital formats were available at 
reasonable prices, the court concluded that the uses were less likely to be fair. 
In contrast, when no electronic copies were available or were offered only at 
unreasonable fees, a finding of fair use was much more likely.82 Although I 
do not think the availability (or lack thereof) of such licensing should be 
dispositive of fair use, it certainly is relevant. Market failure can be an 
appropriate basis on which to find fair use (or perhaps craft a reasonable, 
compulsory licensing fee),83 but the absence of market failure should not bar 
a fair use defense. 
My focus here, however, is not on when licensing markets should be 
considered, but when they should not be considered in fair use analysis. The 
clearance culture described above and courts’ reliance on such licensing 
practices have contracted the scope of fair use in concerning ways. One 
possible way to address this overreliance on risk-averse licensing practices is 
to codify an explicit rejection of cases like Ringgold. The fair use provision 
could explicitly state that the commonness of licensing should not determine 
commerciality or likely market harm. For example: “Evidence of whether 
licensing is customary in a particular context should not be considered.” 
Given the discussion of other aspects of private ordering in this article, it 
might be useful to have a broader provision that would list a series of 
disfavored considerations in the fair use context.84 Additional language could 
 
 79. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012), rev’d on 
other grounds, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014). After the 
substantive editing of this Article was complete, the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in 
Patton. The appellate decision largely agreed with the market failure analysis of the district 
court. See id. at 1275–81. 
 80. Id. at 1201. 
 81. Id. at passim. 
 82. Id. 
 83. I am open to Jane Ginsburg’s thoughtful idea to shift, in some limited instances, 
some fair use from an on/off switch to a “permitted, but paid” regime. See Jane C. Ginsburg, 
Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383 (2014). However, I am 
not convinced that only “new works” should benefit from “(free) fair use,” nor that all “new 
works” should escape payment. Also, the boundaries of what constitutes a new work may be 
challenging to delineate.  
 84. See discussion infra Section VI.A. 
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clarify that the existence of a feasible and reasonably priced licensing market 
may nevertheless be considered as one among several considerations.  
Changing the effect of customary licensing practices on fair use 
evaluations will provide an important and positive pushback against the 
dominant clearance culture. Parties will not have to license just because 
everyone else is doing it. Instead, they will only need to license when they 
otherwise think the use is not fair. The uncertainty of fair use may still drive 
some risk-averse licensing, but the feedback loop created by such licensing 
will be disrupted. Making fair use more predictable, adding safe harbors, and 
limiting the scope of statutory damages, as I discuss in Part VI, will also 
encourage assertions of fair use and more frequent and positive engagement 
with copyrighted works. 
III. THE PROLIFERATION OF USE GUIDELINES  
In response to some of the uncertain areas of fair use and the clearance 
culture that has followed, a variety of private agreements and guidelines have 
been developed to set forth either safe zones of uses or parameters for 
compliance with fair use in particular arenas. There is a wide range of such 
“agreements,” “guidelines,” “statements,” and “codes.”85 In some instances, 
companies set forth their own internal guidelines to facilitate corporate 
compliance with copyright law.86 Industries and trade groups have also 
sought to insulate themselves from liability by agreeing in a more formal 
manner to a set of standard copying practices.87 Sometimes these guidelines 
or agreements have developed with a broad base of parties, but more 
frequently only a few parties (often with common views) agree on what they 
think are appropriate uses of others’ copyrighted works. Unsurprisingly, 
owner-dominated groups have largely set forth restrictive guidelines and 
user-dominated groups mostly more permissive ones.  
I will focus on two primary examples of such guidelines. The first is the 
Classroom Guidelines that were explicitly commissioned by Congress to 
provide guidance in the educational context. Members of Congress could not 
agree on statutory language to address the use of copyrighted works in the 
 
 85. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 1916–24. 
 86. Id. at 1922. 
 87. See, e.g., Robert S. Bray, Photocopying and Copyright: A Progress Report, 48 SPECIAL 
LIBRARIES 100, 101–03 (1957) (Chairman of Photographic Reproduction Committee urging 
adoption of policy regarding library photocopying to avoid an “unfavorable incident” in 
which publishers sue); Excerpts of Record at 696–97, Roy Export Co. Establishment of 
Vaduz v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1981) (Nos. 81-7027, 7109) 
(Testimony of Eaton); Heins & Beckles, supra note 10, at 20–21; Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973). 
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classroom, so they punted the issue to private parties to resolve. The second 
example is a series of best practices “statements” and “codes” put out by 
American University’s Center for Social Media. These statements claim to set 
forth guidelines (and a preferred approach) for evaluating fair use in different 
contexts in communities that frequently rely on the use of others’ 
copyrighted works. I will discuss each of these guidelines in turn.  
A. THE CLASSROOM GUIDELINES 
The most influential of the non-statutory copyright guidelines is the 
“Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit 
Educational Institutions,” commonly referred to as the “Classroom 
Guidelines.” While drafting the fair use section of the 1976 Copyright Act, 
Congress recruited industry representatives, in particular publishers, to 
develop their own guidelines for what constituted fair use of writings and 
music in educational settings.88 The chairman and other members of the 
subcommittee working on the copyright revision “urged the parties to meet 
together independently in an effort to achieve a meeting of the minds as to 
permissible educational uses of copyrighted material.”89 Congress contended 
that “workable voluntary arrangements” were the preferable solution to 
questions regarding the scope of fair use, at least in the context of 
educational uses.90 Unfortunately, the Classroom Guidelines were developed 
and negotiated primarily by large publishers and a few author organizations; 
educators, universities, and scholars were only minimally represented and 
students were entirely voiceless in the process.91 No educator or university 
organization was a signatory to the Guidelines.92 The American Association 
of University Professors and the American Association of Law Schools 
actively opposed the guidelines.93 
In light of this history, these guidelines unsurprisingly take a narrow view 
of what sort of uses of copyrighted works are permissible in the educational 
 
 88. The Author-Publisher Group, Author’s League, Association of American 
Publishers, Inc., and the Chairman of the Copyright Committee signed the resulting 
agreement on Classroom Guidelines. AGREEMENT ON GUIDELINES FOR CLASSROOM 
COPYING IN NOT-FOR-PROFIT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO BOOKS 
AND PERIODICALS, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68–70 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5659, 5681–83.  
 89. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5680. 
 90. H.R. REP. NO. 90-83, at 33, 36 (1967); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67–68, reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5680–82. 
 91. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 1918–19. 
 92. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 72, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5685. See also Basic 
Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1535 n.10 (describing Peter 
Jaszi’s testimony that the guidelines were forced on educators). 
 93. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 72, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5685. 
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context. The Guidelines provide that single copies of the following items may 
be made for or by teachers for use in teaching or research: “a chapter from a 
book, an article from a periodical or newspaper, a short story, short essay or 
short poem and a chart, graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon or picture from a 
book, periodical or newspaper.”94 Multiple copies, not exceeding one copy 
per enrolled student, are permitted under more limited circumstances where 
such uses are deemed to meet tests for brevity, spontaneity, and cumulative 
effect.95 Brevity is defined as less than 250 words of a poem and a range of 
500–2500 words of a prose work depending on its nature.96 The copies must 
also include a notice of copyright.97 
Although the Guidelines purport to set forth the minimum allowable 
uses, many universities, other educational institutions, and libraries have 
followed them as if they represent the maximum allowable uses.98 Many 
universities have handed out the Guidelines to their professors and mandated 
conformity with them.99 The Berkman Center for Internet & Society has 
estimated that 80% of American universities comply with the Guidelines.100 
Some universities will only defend professors against copyright infringement 
actions if they conform to the Guidelines, or if they act with the express 
 
 94. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5682. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS 52 (1979) (treating Guidelines as if they provided binding rules for 
educational uses and suggesting without support that educators participated in development 
of guidelines). 
 99. See, e.g., ACADEMIC PLANNING PROGRAMS AND COORDINATION, UNIV. OF CAL. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UNIV. OF CAL. POLICY: REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED 
MATERIALS FOR TEACHING AND RESEARCH (1986), available at http://policy.ucop.edu/ 
doc/2100007/ReproCopyrightMaterial [hereinafter U.C. Policy]; ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 259 n.73 (1991) (describing 
Stanford University practice in the 1980s).  
 100. William W. Fisher & William McGeveran, The Digital Learning Challenge: Obstacles to 
Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital Age, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & 
SOC’Y 57 (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/2006-09. The 
Classroom Guidelines are not the only copyright guidelines routinely followed. Similar Music 
Guidelines were developed to govern the use of musical works in classrooms. Many libraries 
also conform to the guidelines issued by CONTU (Commission on New Technological Uses 
of Copyrighted Works) governing Photocopying Under Interlibrary Loan Arrangements. 
CONTU Guidelines, supra note 98 (limiting photocopies to 5 articles per periodical title per 
year). 
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approval of university counsel.101 Some universities go even further than the 
Guidelines and require that all material circulated in the classroom be 
accompanied by release forms or be purchased.102 More recently, a few 
universities have bucked this trend. The University of Minnesota has chosen 
to defend professors if they reasonably believe fair use applies even if the use 
exceeds the Classroom Guidelines.103 At the beginning of 2014, NYU 
withdrew its requirement that faculty comply with the Classroom Guidelines 
and the school now allows its faculty to conduct a fair use analysis in 
conjunction with the library staff and legal counsel.104 
Courts have often (though not universally) viewed copying exceeding the 
Guidelines as unfair even though the Guidelines are not legally binding.105 In 
Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp.,106 for example, Kinko’s infringement 
was viewed as bad faith in part because Kinko’s in-house handbook noted 
that its copying practices exceeded the standards of the Classroom 
 
 101. See, e.g., U.C. Policy, supra note 99; FIN. AND ADMIN. POLICIES & PROCEDURES, 
UNIV. OF VA., COPYING OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL (1987), available at 
http://www.virginia.edu/polproc/pol/xvf1.html [hereinafter Virginia Policy]. 
 102. See, e.g., Virginia Policy, supra note 101. 
 103. See UNIV. OF MINN. PAGE FOR INSTRUCTORS, https://www.lib.umn 
.edu/copyright/university-minnesota-instructors/ (last visited June 9, 2014). 
 104. Compare N.Y. UNIV., OFFICE OF THE PROVOST, STATEMENT OF POLICY AND 
GUIDELINES ON EDUCATIONAL AND RESEARCH USES OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS 
(2014), available at http://www.nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu/compliance/documents/ 
CopyrightedMaterials.1.6.14.pdf [hereinafter 2014 NYU Policy] with N.Y. UNIV., UNIVERSITY 
POLICY ON PHOTOCOPYING COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS (1983), available at http://www. 
nyu.edu/content/dam/nyu/compliance/documents/photocopying.pdf [hereinafter 1983 
NYU Policy] (requiring compliance with Classroom Guidelines and withdrawing the 
university’s indemnification for failure to comply without express approval of counsel). 
 105. H.R REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68, 70–71 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5682–85 
(noting that the Classroom Guidelines are not legally binding and are “not intended to limit 
the types of copying permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial decision”). 
Examples of courts that have relied on the Classroom Guidelines in fair use determinations 
include: Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390–91 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(rejecting fair use defense in part because preparation of course packets exceeded 
Guidelines); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 919, 919 n.5 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(rejecting fair use defense when private-sector copying exceeded Guidelines); Marcus v. 
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting fair use defense because copying 
for class materials exceeded Guidelines); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. 
Supp. 1522, 1530, 1535–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding preparation of course packets not a fair 
use because violated Guideline’s prohibition on anthologies). But see Cambridge Univ. Press 
v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1227–29 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (rejecting argument that the uses 
of copyrighted works were not fair because they exceeded the Guidelines), rev’d on other 
grounds, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1283 (11th Cir. 2014) (agreeing 
with district court’s rejection of the Guidelines). 
 106. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
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Guidelines.107 Thus, these guidelines that were intended to state a minimum 
floor of allowable uses have frequently set the ceiling on educational uses. 
B. BEST-PRACTICES STATEMENTS AND CODES OF FAIR USE 
Various use communities, in an effort to encourage and support greater 
assertion of fair use rights to counteract the dominant clearance culture, have 
recently begun to develop their own informal guidelines for fair use. In 
contrast to the Classroom Guidelines, these guidelines seek to encourage, 
rather than to limit, the use of copyrighted works. The most prominent 
example of such an approach is the Best Practices Statements and Codes 
produced by American University’s Center for Social Media. These 
statements have been helpful in a number of ways, providing guidance to 
those who are lost in the fair use thicket (particularly documentary 
filmmakers) and ideally helping to insulate them against findings of willful 
infringement.108 Many of these statements and codes were preceded by 
reports that usefully documented the fair use needs of particular 
communities.109 
The Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement of Best Practices (hereinafter 
“Filmmakers’ Statement ”) is the oldest and most well known of these 
statements. It sets forth four categories of uses of others’ copyrighted works 
that are likely fair in the context of documentary films. The privileged 
categories are critique or commentary, illustrative quoting, incidental uses 
(i.e., captured during the filming process), and uses in historical sequences.110 
Each of these categories contains a number of “limitations.” Such limitations 
include, for example, in the context of the category approving the use of 
“copyrighted works of popular culture to illustrate an argument or point,” a 
suggestion that documentarians should “assure that the material is properly 
attributed . . . [; that] quotations are drawn from a range of different sources[; 
that] each quotation . . . is no longer than is necessary to achieve the intended 
 
 107. Id. at 1535–37, 1544–45 (holding that there was a willful infringement in the 
context of a violation of the classroom guidelines). 
 108. See Rothman, supra note 50, passim (providing a detailed discussion of the value and 
pitfalls of these statements). 
 109. See, e.g., Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE 
CONFUSING: USER-GENERATED VIDEO CREATORS ON COPYRIGHT (2007), available at 
http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/good_bad_confusing.pdf; Patricia Aufderheide 
& Peter Jaszi, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RIGHTS CLEARANCE 
CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 22 (2004), available at http://www. 
cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/ UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf. 
 110. CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, DOCUMENTARY 
FILMMAKERS’ STATEMENT OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE 4–5 (2005), available at 
http://www.cmsimpact.org/fair use/best-practices/documentary/documentary-filmmakers-
statement-best-practices-fair use [hereinafter Filmmakers’ Statement]. 
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effect; [and that] the quoted material is not employed merely in order to 
avoid the cost or inconvenience of shooting equivalent footage.”111  
Another example of such guidelines is the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use 
for OpenCourseWare (hereinafter “OpenCourseWare Code”). The OpenCourseWare 
Code provides five categories of uses favored for fair use. Three of the five 
categories overlap with those set forth in the Filmmakers’ Statement: incidental 
uses, uses for critique and analysis, and illustrative uses. Two additional 
categories are then added that favor demonstrative or explanatory uses, and 
“assigned and supplementary materials.”112 Once again each category contains 
a number of significant limitations. The category of uses of copyrighted 
works for demonstrative or explanatory uses, for example, is limited to 
circumstances when the use is not “cumulative,” there is “[n]o ready 
substitute [available] (including one that the instructor himself or herself 
could create with reasonable effort),” the extent of the use is appropriate, and 
attribution is provided where “reasonably possible.”113  
The Filmmakers’ Statement, which was published in 2005, has had a 
positive effect in combating the clearance culture described in Part II.114 
After its adoption, various film industry gatekeepers, such as Errors & 
Omissions (“E & O”) insurers and production companies, reconsidered their 
policies and became more willing to insure, produce, and distribute 
documentary films that had not licensed all copyrighted material included 
within the films.115 If a filmmaker claimed that the uses were fair and that he 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES 
IN FAIR USE FOR OPENCOURSEWARE 10–14 (2009), available at http://www.cmsimpact.org/ 
ocw/ [hereinafter OpenCourseWare Code]. 
 113. Id. at 13–14. 
 114. The Filmmakers’ Statement has not been as successful with bigger players in the 
industry or in the movie industry outside of documentary filmmaking. Many distributors still 
demand clearance, and the overall film and television communities remain very much at the 
heart of the clearance culture. Nor has compliance with the best practices statements 
stopped copyright holders from suing if they do not think a use is fair. See, e.g., Aguiar v. 
Webb, No. 1:07CV1167371-2 (D. Mass.). In Aguiar, the plaintiff filed and pursued a 
copyright infringement suit despite the claim by the defendant that he had complied with the 
Filmmakers’ Statement. See Amended Complaint, Aguiar v. Webb, No. 1:07CV1167371-2 (D. 
Mass.) (filed on March 24, 2008); Answer to Restatement of Counterclaim, Aguiar v. Webb, 
No. 1:07CV1167371-2 (D. Mass.) (filed May 23, 2008). The case was eventually settled. Joint 
Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Aguiar v. Webb, No. 1:07CV1167371-2 (D. Mass.) 
(May 3, 2010).  
 115. Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Fair Use and Best Practices: Surprising Success, 
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Oct. 2007, at a. A number of other factors also likely contributed to 
a move away from the clearance culture, at least in the context of documentary films. In part, 
the public relations drive surrounding the Filmmakers’ Statement’s release may have been more 
effective than the statement itself. The development of legal clinics to support filmmakers if 
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or she had complied with the terms of the Filmmakers’ Statement, then E & O 
insurers became willing to issue insurance.116 Distributors and producers also 
became more willing to rely on fair use rather than to require by rote that all 
uses be licensed ones.117 Shortly after the release of the Filmmakers’ Statement, a 
number of filmmakers were able to release films at the Sundance Film 
Festival that had been threatened with removal from the program because of 
clearance problems.118 Notably, Kirby Dick’s film, THIS FILM IS NOT YET 
RATED, which used more than one hundred unlicensed movie clips, was 
screened and subsequently distributed theatrically and on home video.119 PBS 
and the Independent Film Channel have relied on the Filmmakers’ Statement to 
develop their own internal standards and practices.120  
In addition to the successful push to increase assertions of fair use, there 
are many other potential benefits of these statements. The broad categories 
of uses (such as illustrative, incidental, historical, and critical), as well as some 
of the limitations (e.g., not using more than is necessary to make the relevant 
point) track current fair use law, are normatively appropriate, and provide 
clear guidance to non-lawyers.  
Nevertheless, there are reasons to discourage the wholesale codification 
of these statements and codes, as well as their treatment by courts as setting 
the standard for fair use in a particular arena. First, like the Classroom 
Guidelines, the drafters of the best practices statements have thus far not 
included a particularly representative group of parties whose interests are 
affected by the particular uses. None of the best practices statements that I 
have reviewed has included representation of content providers whose work 
is most likely to be used. The Filmmakers’ Statement, for example, did not 
bring into the process the parties whose works were most likely to be 
included in the documentaries. For example, no major movie studios or 
record companies were approached or included.121 Although I agree with the 
 
they are sued has also been crucial, as has Stanford University’s offer to insure any 
documentary filmmaker who could not obtain insurance but who had viable fair use claims. 
See Colette Vogele, Insurance Resource for Documentary Filmmakers, STANFORD UNIV. CTR. FOR 
INTERNET AND SOCIETY BLOG (Feb. 27, 2007, 5:55 AM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/ 
node/5209/. Cf. Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra, at b (discussing Stanford University’s Fair Use 
Project and its commitment to defend filmmakers who comply with the Filmmakers’ 
Statement ) 
 116. Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 115, at a, b. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id.; Patricia Aufderheide, How Documentary Filmmakers Overcame their Fear of Quoting 
and Learned to Employ Fair Use: A Tale of Scholarship in Action, INT’L J. COMM. 26, 33–34 (2007). 
 120. Aufderheide, supra note 119, at 34; Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 115, at a.  
 121. See, e.g., Filmmakers’ Statement, supra note 111, at 2; see also OpenCourseWare Code, supra 
note 113. 
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drafters that consensus would likely not have been reached had these big 
content providers been included, the failure to even try to include them in 
the discussion highlights the one-sidedness of the statements. Moreover, the 
fact that it is unlikely that the two (or, more accurately, many) different sides 
could agree on any common principles should raise serious flags about 
relying on these statements as expressions of the appropriate boundaries of 
fair use.  
Even within the relevant use community there have been complaints that 
only a limited number of parties were brought to the table during the 
development of the statements. Both documentary filmmakers and librarians 
have raised concerns to me because their expressed views were not 
adequately reflected in the final statements or codes. Members of the 
Association of College & Research Libraries (“ACRL”) have expressed 
concerns that the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and Research 
Libraries, developed by American University and the Association of Research 
Libraries, is not reflective of their needs or preferences, nor of the comments 
some of them had shared with the drafters of the Code.122 I point this out 
not to address the substantive merits of the specific areas of disagreement 
between these groups of expert and equally well-intentioned librarians, but 
instead to highlight some of the concerns of adopting any of these 
statements as expressions of the scope of fair use in a particular context. 
A second major concern with the statements is that in their drafters’ 
efforts to provide greater clarity to users, the specific guidelines sometimes 
exceed or narrow the boundaries of fair use beyond what is appropriate.123 
 
 122. These opinions were conveyed to me at the 2012 annual meeting of the American 
Library Association, at which I spoke to members of the Copyright Discussion Group of the 
ACRL. 
 123. See Rothman, supra note 50, at 376–78 (discussing questionable interpretation of 
fair use). For purposes of this Article, I will not focus on this aspect of the best practices 
statements, though the lack of consideration of market harm in the fair use analysis is 
another basis not to adopt the statements as complete expressions of the boundaries of fair 
use. See id.; see also Filmmakers’ Statement, supra note 111, at 2; OpenCourseWare Code, supra note 
113 (although noting that injury to copyright holders’ earnings has some relevance, listing 
only “transformativeness” and “amount used” as “core” considerations in determining fair 
use). Even though it is true that transformativeness has become increasingly important in 
recent years in fair use assessments, it has not completely replaced market harm as a 
consideration. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 584–86, 616–17 (2008) (determining that 83.8% of the time 
the evaluation of market harm correlates with the outcome of dispositive opinions). The 
statements also sometimes ignore caselaw that is not favorable to the communities or uses 
addressed by the statements. For example, the OpenCourseWare Code does not address the 
course packet cases in which courts have held that the copying of assigned materials for 
course packets is not fair use. For a discussion of the course packet cases, see Rothman, 
supra note 7, at 1935, 1940, 1953–54. 
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Some of the statements limit uses beyond the requirements of copyright law 
and in ways that would be detrimental to various creative and educational 
communities if enforced. As mentioned, each of the statements contains 
express “limitations” on categories of uses that would otherwise be fair. 
Some of these limitations are overly restrictive.    
One telling example limits incidental uses in circumstances that should be 
uncontroversially fair. The Filmmakers’ Statement limits incidental uses of 
music captured on film so that an editor and director cannot cut or edit a 
scene or sequence to the beat of the captured music or allow the music to 
spillover to another scene.124 Cutting to the rhythm of the music is an integral 
part of the craft of filmmaking and allowing music from one scene to spill 
over during a scene transition is an important technique. If the music is 
captured incidentally, rather than purposefully, it should not matter how the 
filmmaker constructs the scene in post-production as long as the incidentally 
captured material is not substantially divorced from the situation in which it 
was first recorded. Cutting to the beat of the music or smoothing out a scene 
transition does not unmoor the incidentally copyrighted works from the 
setting in which the music was first captured. 
Another example from the Filmmakers’ Statement is a principle that limits 
the ability to make documentary films that revolve around copyrighted 
works. The Statement requires that “[t]o support a claim that a use [of 
copyrighted works in a historical sequence] is fair, the documentarian should 
be able to show that . . . the film project was not specifically designed around 
the material in question.”125 This suggestion is out of sync with the demands 
of filmmakers and even with the broad permitted categories of illustrative 
and historical sequences. Documentary projects should continue to be able 
to be designed around copyrighted works. For example, documentaries about 
1950s television sitcoms, the Beach Boys, or the portrayal of gay characters 
in film and television are legitimate projects, even though each project would 
by necessity focus on copyrighted works. To throw all such films into a 
disfavored category is especially concerning when so much of our culture—
that a filmmaker might want to comment on—is composed of copyrighted 
works. Based on conversations with several attorneys at legal clinics that 
frequently consider the best-practices statements, I suspect that the drafters 
of the best-practices statements would agree with my assessment that these 
uses should be fair and might even claim that such uses would fit within the 
protected zones of the Statement. Nevertheless, this confusion about how to 
interpret the Statement demonstrates the challenge of overlaying an 
 
 124. Filmmakers’ Statement, supra note 111, at 5. 
 125. Id. at 5–6. 
1622 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1595  
additional text, with its own share of ambiguities and missteps, on an already 
complicated fair use structure.  
The Statements and Codes also impose additional burdens on users that 
are not required by copyright law and that have not been established as 
indicative of fair use. The OpenCourseWare Code, for example, places 
significant burdens on educators. Even though incidental uses of copyrighted 
works in open courseware are viewed as a category favoring fair use, 
educators must first try to remove copyrighted works from their materials 
before being able to claim fair use.126 There is no explanation for why 
educators should have to make such an effort. If the use is fair, it should not 
be solely because the material was inseparable. The Code also limits 
illustrative and explanatory uses to one example or illustration per point.127 
As any experienced teacher knows, students learn through repetition—so 
why can’t examples be cumulative? The Code also states that educators 
should not use copyrighted works if the educator could create other material 
independently or substitute non-copyrighted works. These limitations 
concede far too much ground to copyright holders and are not required by 
current fair use law. 
The drafters of the best-practices statements also make a number of 
concerning statements about fair use that run throughout all of the 
statements and codes. Many of the statements suggest a preference for 
licensing when material is easily available at reasonable rates.128 The 
Filmmakers’ Statement requires all copyrighted works used in historical 
sequences to be licensed if licenses can be obtained at reasonable rates. This 
preference for licensing continues to make non-licensed uses suspect, the 
very opposite of what that the best practices statements were trying to 
achieve. By doing so, the best practices statements ironically further endorse 
a concept of fair use limited to situations involving market failure (in which 
licensing is not possible or the offered rates are unreasonable).129  
My concern is not only with the ways the statements restrict fair uses, but 
also with instances in which the statements permit uses that either are not 
fair or at least are controversial and unsettled areas of fair use analysis. For 
example, the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Online Video deems virtually all 
uses fair because the commentary and critique category is read very 
 
 126. OpenCourseWare Code, supra note 113, at 10–11. 
 127. Id. at 12–13. 
 128. See, e.g., id. at 13–14 (suggesting that if there is an available licensing regime 
educators should license demonstrative and explanatory uses, as well as supplementary and 
assigned readings). 
 129. I have previously critiqued this model of fair use. See Rothman, supra note 76, at 
528–29, 532–33. 
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broadly.130 In the report supporting this code, the drafters suggest that a 
mashup titled Clint Eastwood’s “The Office,” which mixed together clips 
from the television series The Office with the movie Evan Almighty, would be a 
fair use.131 This conclusion was based on an assessment that such a use would 
fit within the favored category of commentary or critique.132 Although it may 
not be immediately apparent how this mashup is a commentary, the 
contention is that this user-generated content shows what it would be like if 
Clint Eastwood directed an episode of The Office and therefore provides a 
cultural commentary on the two films and Eastwood as well.133 This analysis 
opens the door so wide that there can be no market for licensing material for 
such mashups. I do not think fair use demands such a broad reading. There 
is at least a colorable argument that such mashups would cause significant 
market harm and interfere with new business models for content creators. 
Not all mashups are infringing, but neither are they all fair.134 This is still a 
developing area and one private group with its own particular interests 
should not determine the scope of fair use in this context for everyone.  
Thus far, courts have not given credence to (or rejected) these best 
practices statements and codes. Parties nevertheless are beginning to cite 
them more frequently in their briefs as a basis for asserting fair use.135 
 
 130. CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR ONLINE 
VIDEO (2008), available at http://www.cmsimpact.org/sites/default/files/online_best 
_practices_in_fair_use.pdf.  
 131. CTR FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, RECUT, REFRAME, RECYCLE: QUOTING COPYRIGHTED 
MATERIAL IN USER-GENERATED VIDEO 7–9 (2008), available at http://www.cmsimpact. 
org/sites/default/files/CSM_Recut_Reframe_Recycle_report.pdf. 
 132. Id. at 8 (classifying this mashup as a “meta-commentary” that fits within the 
preferred category of “negative or crucial commentary”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. The Department of Commerce’s Internet Task Force has remained neutral on the 
issue and has called for further discussion and roundtables on the issue. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 3, 28–29, 101. 
 135. See, e.g., Brief of Appellees at 15–16, 54, Cambridge Univ. Press v. Albert, Nos. 12-
14676-FF, 12-15147-FF (11th Cir. argued Nov. 19, 2013) (citing the Copyright Clearance 
Center’s (“CCC”) fair use checklist and citing the CCC’s “White Paper” dated March 2011 
titled “Using Electronic Reserves: Guidelines and Best Practices for Copyright Compliance,” 
arguing the district court correctly applied fair use because the electronic use of one book 
chapter is a “best practice”); Reply Brief of Appellants, Cambridge Univ. Press, at 25 n.6 (citing 
to the CCC’s White Paper, arguing that the district court erroneously applied fair use because 
the CCC “advises the opposite of what the district court did”); Brief for American Library 
Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Cambridge Univ. Press, at 4, 6–10, 
13–14, 18, (citing and quoting the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for Academic and 
Research Libraries, asserting fair use on the basis that the university’s electronic reserves 
policy “[e]mbodies [w]idespread and [w]ell-[e]stablished [b]est [p]ractices in [f]air [u]se”); 
Brief for Org. for Transformative Works et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant Stephanie Lenz, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., Nos. 13-16106, 13-16107, 
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Although the drafters of the statements point out that they do not intend the 
statements to set forth the full scope of fair use, courts may view uses that 
exceed the limits of these statements as suspect. This is exactly what we have 
seen happen elsewhere—as with courts’ treatment of violations of the 
Classroom Guidelines and dominant industry licensing practices. The 
possibility that the best-practices statements will set the ceiling rather than 
the floor of fair use is particularly concerning given some of the problematic 
limits set forth within the codes and statements. 
C. LIMITING THE ROLE OF PRIVATE FAIR USE GUIDELINES 
Despite my concerns about the best-practices statements and the 
problematic history of the Classroom Guidelines, both of these types of 
guidelines are useful. They are informative and highlight potential areas of 
fair use needs in given communities. Any reforms to the Copyright Act 
should continue to allow room for the development of such statements. The 
law, however, should clarify that courts should not be bound by these 
guidelines when deciding fair use. Neither compliance nor noncompliance 
with the statements and other private fair use guidelines should provide a 
basis to find or reject fair use. As with the risk-averse clearance-culture 
practices, the law should not lock in these aspects of private ordering. 
Government agencies involved in copyright laws and policies have 
increasingly referred to these private fair use guidelines, but have not fully 
engaged with either their benefits or pitfalls.136 The Department of 
Commerce recently stated that it “supports private efforts to explore the 
parameters of fair use, and notes that best practices produced with input 
from both user groups and right holders can offer the greatest certainty.”137 
Even though the Department of Commerce has stated its support of such 
guidelines in theory, it appropriately noted that the guidelines would be only 
minimally useful in creating safe spaces for “fair” uses unless a variety of 
 
at *28 (9th Cir. appeal docketed May 31, 2013) (arguing that Universal Music can make fair 
use assessments before issuing takedown notices by relying on American University’s Best 
Practices Statements); Brief for American Library Association et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Appellees and Affirmance at 5–6, 17–19, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 
12-4547, 2014 WL 2576342 (2d Cir. 2014) (arguing that HathiTrust Digital Library’s uses 
were fair because they were consistent with the Code of Best Practices in Fair Use for 
Academic and Research Libraries). But see Mot. to Dismiss Second Amend. Compl., Lenz v. 
Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008), at 5 (arguing against using 
Electronic Frontier Foundation’s “Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content,” 
because the principles are not found in the Copyright Act). 
 136. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 22–23, 29, 65 (pointing to American 
University’s fair use guidelines and the fair use checklist created at Columbia). 
 137. Id. at 23. 
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parties on different sides of the issues were represented in the guidelines’ 
development.138 
IV. ALTERNATIVE OVERLAYS TO COPYRIGHT: THE 
CREATIVE COMMONS APPROACH  
The difficulty of determining the limits and exceptions to copyright law, 
which has driven both the clearance culture and the various private 
guidelines discussed in Parts II and III, has encouraged several other efforts 
to provide a greater ability to use copyrighted works. Instead of focusing on 
the users, some efforts have focused on creators who would prefer a 
copyright law that is more permissive and that makes it easier for third-
parties to use and share works. One of the most successful of these efforts is 
Creative Commons. Creative Commons is a nonprofit organization that was 
formed in 2001 with the idea of layering an alternative, formalized licensing 
regime on top of existing copyright law.139 Creative Commons’s mission is to 
provide greater freedom to use works than the defaults of copyright law. The 
project has been tremendously successful. Hundreds of millions of works 
have been licensed using Creative Commons licenses.140 Major bands and 
recording artists, such as Nine Inch Nails and David Byrne, have used these 
licenses, as have Al Jazeera, Google, the California Digital Open Source 
Library, and even the White House.141 The most common Creative 
Commons licenses require attribution but permit noncommercial derivative 
works or adaptations if the new work is distributed in a share-alike manner—
i.e., under the same Creative Commons licensing regime under which it is 
licensed.142 
 
 138. See id.; see also Rothman, supra note 7, at 1972–73. 
 139. See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited June 9, 2014). 
 140. Brief for Creative Commons Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 1–2, Jacobson v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 141. Id. at *1; Who Uses CC?, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/who-
uses-cc/ (last visited June 16, 2014); S.B. 1053 Creates the California Open Source Digital Library, 
CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/S.B._1053_Creates_the_California 
_Open_Source_Digital_Library/ (last visited July 23, 2014). 
 142. License Statistics, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Metrics/ 
License_statistics/ (last modified Mar. 2, 2014, 3:46 PM). Attribution is now a requirement 
of all Creative Commons licenses, but it started out as an option that licensors could choose.  
Creative Commons defines a derivative work as a “work based upon the Work or upon the 
Work and other pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, 
dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, 
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which the Work may be recast, transformed, 
or adapted . . . .” License, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/3.0/us/legalcode/ (last visited June 29, 2014). 
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Creative Commons is not intended to replace copyright law, but instead 
provides an easy way to tailor the scope of copyright for particular creators 
who only want to exercise some, rather than all of the exclusive rights that 
copyright provides.143 The Creative Commons motto is “some rights 
reserved,” as opposed to copyright law’s traditional “all rights reserved.”144 
Creative Commons is an important intervention in the one-size-fits-all 
approach to copyright and one that does not need codification. It both 
facilitates the enactment of particular authors’ preferences and the 
communication of those preferences to potential users. 
Copyright law should support alternative regimes like Creative 
Commons. This can largely be done by staying clear of the fray. 
Nevertheless, there are some ways that future copyright revisions could 
support (or at least not discourage) the adoption of Creative Commons and 
other alternative licenses. In particular, it would be helpful to clarify that a 
violation of a Creative Commons license or other private overlay does not 
put a user in a worse position than if she had used a copyrighted work that 
was not put out under such a license. Although the legal code to the Creative 
Commons licenses expressly states this, it is not clear that courts or litigants 
will so interpret the effect of these licenses.  
Under the current regime, users might avoid Creative Commons–licensed 
works, particularly if they know they cannot comply with the terms of the 
licenses.145 Many users cannot comply with the share-alike provision, 
particularly when it limits uses to those that are noncommercial.146 
 
 143. See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited June 9, 2014). 
There have been a number of smaller scale efforts to provide alternative visions of copyright 
law. The American Library Association as early as the 1970s started distributing journals with 
notices that the journals could “be photocopied for the noncommercial purpose of scientific 
or educational advancement” without permission. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 51 (1979). 
 144. Creative Commons licenses also allow for the dedication of works to the public 
domain. In these instances, rather than “some rights [being] reserved,” “no rights [are] 
reserved.” See CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/ (last visited June 9, 
2014). 
 145. I have had several conversations with documentary filmmakers who have been 
reluctant to use works licensed under Creative Commons licenses once they realize that they 
cannot conform to the offered license, even if they have a strong fair use defense. 
 146. The term noncommercial is not defined, but has often been interpreted as uses that 
are for an economic profit. Creative Commons has determined that most Internet users 
consider something commercial when users earn money for the use (whether via online 
advertising or otherwise). See CREATIVE COMMONS, DEFINING “NONCOMMERCIAL”: A 
STUDY OF HOW THE ONLINE POPULATION UNDERSTANDS “NONCOMMERCIAL USE” 11–12 
(2009). This interpretation of “noncommercial” means that documentary films distributed 
for any payment would be considered commercial. 
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Filmmakers, for example, even documentary filmmakers, usually seek some 
sort of commercial distribution for their projects. When deciding whether to 
rely on fair use of a Creative Commons work or fair use of a traditionally 
distributed one, users may avoid Creative Commons works. This is true for a 
variety of reasons. 
First, as a practical matter, is a person who licenses under a Creative 
Commons rubric more or less likely to sue for a violation of that license? 
Those who use Creative Commons licenses may well wish to sue for 
copyright infringement if others use the works without following the 
licensing restrictions. Copyright holders who requested that the underlying 
works not be altered or distributed commercially may be particularly likely to 
sue parties who do so in contravention of expressed preferences.147 On the 
other hand, creators who actively seek out the more permissive Creative 
Commons license for their work may be more sympathetic to users and less 
likely to sue for infringement. 
Second, users may worry that a violation of the license will weigh against 
a finding of fair use. As discussed, this is a legitimate fear. When defendants 
exceed their own in-house guidelines or the Classroom Guidelines or fail to 
conform with industry licensing practices, courts are much more likely to 
reject a fair use defense.148 A court may similarly disfavor uses that exceed the 
expressed preference of the creator/owner as set forth in the violated 
Creative Commons license. To the extent that fair use is sometimes thought 
of as an equitable doctrine that considers what is fair in a normative sense, 
courts and juries may be less inclined toward users who knowingly violate the 
express wishes of the copyright holder.149 Even though the all-rights-reserved 
default of copyright law might also limit the intended use, a court might look 
more favorably on such a use because there was no express preference that 
was communicated and then violated.  
 
 147. See, e.g., Complaint at 3–9, Gatehouse Media v. That’s Great News, L.L.C., No. 
10CV50165, 2010 WL 2960003 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2010) (publisher of local newspapers 
disseminated electronically under a Creative Commons license sues for copyright 
infringement when a for-profit business uses reprints of articles and/or plaques with 
articles); Complaint at 3–4, Foster v. Virgin Enters. Ltd., No. 2:14cv04113 (C.D. Cal. May 
29, 2014) (suing for copyright infringement of photograph which had been offered under a 
noncommercial Creative Commons license when it was used by a commercial airline on its 
website without attribution, permission or payment); Cards Against Humanity, L.L.C. v. 
Loftek Technological Co., L.L.C., No. C13-0727, 2013 WL 693441, at *7 (N.D. Cal. 
February 19, 2013) (suing for copyright infringement, inter alia, for sale of knock-off card 
game when plaintiff’s game had been issued under a Creative Commons license). 
 148. See discussion supra at Sections II.B & III.B. 
 149. See Rothman, supra note 7, at 1937–41, 1979–80. 
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To the extent that a fair use defense is rejected, the violation of the 
Creative Commons license could also serve as evidence of bad faith or 
willfulness which will throw the defendant into the higher statutory-damages 
range and open the defendant up to criminal liability. Few courts have 
considered the effect of Creative Commons licenses, though parties have 
filed an increasing number of complaints involving alleged violations of such 
licenses or seeking declaration of noninfringement on the basis of reliance on 
those licenses.150 Notably, some have claimed that at least one entity is using 
Creative Commons licenses to lure users and then, when they take the bait, 
threatening to sue for copyright infringement.151 
A final concern for potential users of works licensed under Creative 
Commons licenses is uncertainty over whether a breach-of-contract claim 
could exist for the violation of the license. The licenses suggest that only 
copyright claims remain if the license terminates,152 but litigants have claimed 
that a breach of the license’s provisions gives rise not only to a claim for 
copyright infringement, but also to a breach-of-contract claim.153 Such a 
contract claim could potentially survive a finding that a use is fair.  
 
 150. See, e.g., Promedical Inc. v. 3 Lions Pub’g Inc., No. 1:12-CV-1355, at *3–7 
(M.D.N.C. December 21, 2012) (seeking declaratory judgment for noninfringement of work 
when complied with Creative Commons license); Amended Complaint for Damages, Dell v. 
Woodstream Corp., No. 09-CV-1010, 2009 WL 1952693 (N.D. Ga. April 21, 2009) 
(copyright infringement claim based on use of work licensed under a Creative Commons 
license); Original Complaint, St. Luke’s Episcopal Health Sys. v. 3 Lions Pub’g, Inc., No. 
4:12-cv-3134, 2012 WL 5362417 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2012) (seeking declaratory judgment for 
noninfringement of work when complied with Creative Commons license); Complaint, 
O’Neill v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. CV11-8193, 2011 WL 4802875 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 
2011) (seeking punitive damages for use of photograph in violation of Creative Commons 
license); see also infra note 153. 
 151. See, e.g., Promedical, No. 1:12-CV-1355, at *3–7 (claiming that 3 Lions was a 
“copyright troll” that used Creative Commons licenses as bait); see also St. Luke’s, 2012 WL 
5362417. 
 152. The license is supposed to terminate upon breach. See, e.g., Creative Commons 
Attribution 3.0 United States License Legal Code, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 
3.0/us/legalcode/ (last visited July 25, 2014). 
 153. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, GateHouse Media, Inc. v. That’s Great News, 
L.L.C., No. 10CV50165, 2010 WL 2960003 (N.D. Ill. June 30, 2010) (suing for both 
copyright infringement and breach of contract for the violation of a Creative Commons 
license and the commercial use of copyrighted news stories); Gatehouse Media Mass. I, Inc. 
v. N.Y. Times Co., No. 1:08-12114-WGY, 2009 WL 301807 (D. Mass, Jan. 22, 2009) (same); 
cf. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that limits on use of 
copyrighted work provided in alternative license were conditions the violation of which 
could give rise to an action for copyright infringement). Creative Commons filed an amicus 
brief in Jacobson advocating for the position that the Federal Circuit ultimately took. 
Violations of Creative Commons licenses give rise to copyright-infringement actions. Brief 
for Creative Commons Corporation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 
6, 11, Jacobson, 535 F.3d 1373. The brief did not address the question of whether there could 
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Another concern with Creative Commons licenses that I have previously 
observed is that courts may import Creative Commons norms into evaluating 
the scope of copyright more broadly.154 It would not be surprising, 
particularly as Creative Commons licenses become more popular, for courts 
to suggest that because a Creative Commons license is available and an 
author did not adopt one, that the copyright holder wants a stronger form of 
copyright. Again, this is not the intention of Creative Commons, but it 
nevertheless may influence courts’ analysis. Courts should not consider the 
fact that a person has chosen not to employ a Creative Commons license as 
somehow revealing a narrower scope of fair use or a broader view of 
copyright.155  
Government agencies have begun to recognize the popularity of Creative 
Commons licenses and the possibility that alternative licensing regimes will 
layer on top of existing copyright law.156 The government, however, has not 
provided an in-depth analysis of how formal law should address these 
agreements. The Copyright Act could explicitly state that violations of such 
licenses—say by sharing, but not sharing alike—should not weigh in favor of 
finding copyright infringement, rejecting a fair use defense, or making a 
finding of willful infringement. An added provision that excludes 
consideration of licensing and private guidelines could also exclude 
consideration of alternative licensing mechanisms available to authors in the 
context of fair use evaluations.157 The statute could also clarify when a breach 
of contract involving a copyrighted work gives rise to a copyright 
infringement claim and a contract claim, or only one or the other. As I will 
discuss in the following Part, such language could also address the broader 
issue of violations of consumer contracts. The Creative Commons legal team 
could address some of these concerns privately by agreeing to defend or at 
least file supporting amicus briefs on behalf of defendants who risk 
additional penalties or the rejection of a fair use defense on the basis of a 
violation of a Creative Commons license. Nevertheless, having copyright law 
directly tackle the issue may provide greater support for these alternative 
 
be a separate breach-of-contract claim nor the effect on licensors who may unreasonably 
seek to recover for copyright-infringement damages even when a party has complied with a 
Creative Commons license. These issues are likely to be litigated over the next few years, but 
Congress may wish to anticipate some of these likely conflicts. 
 154. Rothman, supra note 7, at 1979–80. 
 155. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at n.11, Korpi v. Apple, Inc., No. 11CV00906, 
2012 WL 3137659 (W.D. Tex. May 16, 2012) (noting that plaintiff did not choose to 
distribute her work under the more liberal Creative Commons license). 
 156. Pallante, supra note 1, at 333–34; DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 29 
(suggesting Creative Commons licenses could be a useful way to authorize remixes). 
 157. See discussion supra at Section II.C & infra Section VI.A. 
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regimes. In addition, as I will discuss in Part VI, the Copyright Office could 
provide more choices for authors to opt in or out of particular aspects of 
copyright law through the registration process, potentially including a 
Creative Commons license option.158 
V. USING TECHNOLOGY AND CONTRACTS TO ALTER 
COPYRIGHT’S TRADITIONAL BOUNDARIES 
The last category of private ordering I will address is the effort by 
content creators to enforce their copyrights in the online and digital 
environment, as well as to restrict uses of those works, including 
uncopyrightable aspects. There are two dominant mechanisms for doing so: 
using technology to restrict uses and expand enforcement, and using contract 
law to limit permissible uses. The shift to digital formats has facilitated the 
use of technology to monitor and control uses of works. It also has allowed 
works to be distributed subject to clickwrap (or browsewrap) licenses that 
limit uses of those works.159 This digital shift has often moved consumers 
from owners of physical copies to mere licensees of digital files.  
In contrast to the other types of private ordering discussed thus far, these 
practices are driven primarily by content providers that seek to expand the 
control they have over their copyrighted works. Much has already been 
written about this aspect of private ordering and an in-depth engagement 
with these myriad complex issues is beyond the scope of this project.160 
Nevertheless, it is a vital area to identify and address as part of any project to 
revise copyright law. I will briefly discuss the role of technology and 
contracts, and suggest that the Copyright Act needs to intervene to prevent 
copyright law and its underlying public-minded policy goals from becoming 
obsolete. 
 
 158. See discussion infra Subsection VI.B.2. 
 159. Clickwrap licenses require online users to click to indicate their agreement to 
various license terms. A browsewrap license is provided on a website, but consumers may or 
may not read it and do not ever explicitly agree to its terms; instead, the website operator 
claims to bind the user merely by virtue of the user visiting the website. 
 160. See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008); 
Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Reforming Copyright Owner 
Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 495 (2004); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond 
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999); J.H. 
Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling 
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875 (1999); David 
Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17 (1999); Julie E. 
Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93 (1998), Niva 
Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93 
(1997). 
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A. TECHNOLOGICAL PROTECTION MEASURES AND DIGITAL RIGHTS 
MANAGEMENT 
Content creators and owners have increasingly turned to technology to 
limit uses of their works and to prevent unlawful mass copying of their 
content online. Technology has been used in a variety of ways to restrict 
what can be done with copyrighted works and to identify, track, and remove 
uses of copyrighted works online. Often such technology is put under the 
broad term of technological protection measures (“TPM”), which applies to 
many different types of technology that control both access to and uses of 
copyrighted works. Sometimes the term digital rights management (“DRM”) 
is also used to describe technology that manages access to works, and tracks 
and limits uses of those works.161 Manufacturers embed works with various 
digital marks when they are initially distributed. For example, CDs, DVDs 
and other digital audio and video files are often digitally watermarked. The 
watermarking allows content owners and others to trace back copies to their 
original source. Television studios also embed shows with digital bits (known 
as broadcast flags) that can be used to scan for these files if they are copied 
or uploaded online.  
TPM and DRM make a lot of sense in the online world and pave the way 
for a workable and highly profitable online environment for professional 
content providers. They also allow content creators to price-discriminate 
based on the types of uses consumers would like to make of copyrighted 
works. These are all valuable features that are worth permitting. However, if 
left unchecked, these technologies threaten to profoundly alter the way we 
engage with copyrighted works and not always for the better. 
Restrictive TPM and DRM raise a variety of concerns. First, content 
owners can use technology to effectively eliminate the first sale doctrine in 
the online context, by preventing the sharing or future sale of books and 
music—historically permissible and protected activities. When a person 
purchases a physical copy of a book, she can pass it on to a friend, mate, or 
her heirs after her death. The book can provide continued intellectual 
sustenance to second-comers and a shared experience across generations. 
Now, an individual cannot easily give a book downloaded to a Kindle or 
other digital device to a friend (unless the friends use devices that are 
registered to the same account) and it is not entirely clear whether a Kindle 
 
 161. TPM is also sometimes referred to as “technical protection measures.” The terms 
TPM and DRM are often used interchangeably, although DRM can be used more broadly 
for digital rights management that includes notices of rights or contract terms (sometimes 
this is also called RMI or “rights management information”). For purposes of this 
discussion, I am focusing primarily on the terms’ overlapping areas of meaning. 
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library can be passed on to heirs.162 In fact, users do not even own the books 
downloaded to a Kindle but simply license them.163 Libraries are particularly 
concerned that this shift from an ownership world to one of licensees may 
prevent libraries from loaning books in the future—at least in digital 
formats.164 This sea change in the way we interact with books may be 
acceptable and market pressures may provide consumers with a variety of 
choices in the long run, but we should carefully consider the broader 
implications and whether this is the system that we want. 
Second, TPM can limit the ability to make fair uses of works. For 
example, TPM prevents (or at least significantly restricts) professors from 
copying excerpts of DVDs for use in class, documentarians from using clips 
for illustrative or other purposes in a film, and average citizens and artists 
from making a collage of digital magazine photos for fun, for a class project, 
or in an artwork. Each of these uses is likely fair, but various technologies 
prevent or at least obstruct such uses. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(“DMCA”) worsens this problem by criminalizing the circumvention of 
TPM, even if the underlying uses of the works would otherwise be 
permissible—such as copying facts or making a fair use of a work. Although 
the Copyright Office has approved some exceptions to the 
anticircumvention provisions through the regulatory process (including 
exceptions for documentary filmmakers and educators), these exceptions are 
limited in scope and temporary.165 
Not only does TPM limit how one can use copyrighted works, but these 
technologies also fundamentally alter the landscape of enforcement of 
copyright law. Uses that were never traceable in the analog world are easily 
identifiable and stoppable in the digital world. Content-identification 
software allows content owners and Internet service providers to easily 
identify and remove copyrighted works from the Internet even if the uses of 
those works are fair. Programs can identify copyrighted songs, images, and 
videos. Viacom and Google (on behalf of YouTube) recently made a deal to 
 
 162. Susan from 29, e-Books: Who Owns My Digital Library?, DAILY KOS (May 8, 2013, 
11:00 a.m.), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/05/08/1205979/-e-books-who-owns-
my-digital-library/. I note that some sharing of books that are in the public domain may be 
permitted. 
 163. See generally Michael Seringhaus, E-Book Transactions: Amazon “Kindles” the Copy 
Ownership Debate, 12 YALE L.J. & TECH. 147 (2009) (arguing that ebook transactions should 
be treated as sales to promote public welfare). 
 164. Digital Rights Management (DRM) & Libraries, AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/copyright/digitalrights (last visited June 17, 2014).  
 165. See, e.g., Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, 77 Fed. Reg. 65260 (Oct. 26, 2012) (to be codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
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remove copyrighted Viacom material from YouTube—without considering 
whether various uses might be fair, rather than infringing.166 This technology 
is driven by legitimate efforts to stop online piracy (which I define as the 
wholesale taking and distribution of entire copyrighted works with the intent 
of supplanting the market for the original). However, the software sweeps 
much more broadly. For example, the software may remove video clips that 
have copyrighted music playing in the background while a child shows off his 
dance moves or that contain brief excerpts of Fox News broadcasts that 
have been gathered together to point out various factual errors.167 Not all 
content-identification software removes material. One alternative business 
model, often adopted by record labels, is to advertise alongside the use of the 
copyrighted work—either to generate ad revenue or to sell downloads of the 
song that is used in a video—rather than to remove the unlicensed uses. 
The software that identifies and removes copyrighted content could be 
programmed to allow some breathing room for fair uses, but often it is not. 
For example, NBC developed very successful software to stop piracy of its 
coverage of the 2012 London Olympic games. NBC designed the software to 
remove all material no matter how short in length. If a person posted to her 
blog a short clip of an amazing vault from the women’s gymnastics 
competition that she found inspirational, NBC would have it taken it down. 
If a father posted the last lap of his son’s winning freestyle gold medal swim, 
the software would take it down. NBC could have designed the program to 
allow such short clips, but it did not.168 Major content providers simply are 
not concerned with preserving a space for fair use by consumers, even if they 
are interested in being able to rely on fair use themselves.  
Not every one of the examples I have given in this discussion is 
uncontroversially fair, but many similar uses have historically been permitted 
 
 166. See Meg James, Viacom and Google Settle Massive Copyright Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 
18, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-viacom-and-
google-settle-copyright-lawsuit-20140318-story.html (describing as part of the settlement 
agreement a private deal to monitor and remove Viacom’s copyrighted works, a deal that has 
been made with approximately 5000 other copyright holders). 
 167. Cf. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008), appeal 
docketed, No. 13-16107 (9th Cir. May 31, 2013) (seeking a declaratory judgment of 
noninfringement of Prince’s song after UMG sent a take-down notice for her video of her 
son dancing to Let’s Go Crazy). To see the original video and consider whether it was a 
substitutionary use of Prince’s song, take a look at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
N1KfJHFWlhQ. Also consider the video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
gYsGCNMdvzU (lampooning various Fox News errors in their graphics). 
 168. This information is based on a series of conversations with Glenn Reitmeier, 
Senior Vice President for Advanced Technology, NBC Universal, during The Evolving Internet 
symposium at the University of Pennsylvania on October 19–20, 2012. 
1634 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1595  
(offline), even if only because of enforcement hurdles.169 Current and 
developing technology combined with the shift to digital formats will make 
many uses of copyrighted works that we used to take for granted very 
difficult, if not impossible. As part of the review process we need to do some 
serious soul searching about whether we want personal uses of copyrighted 
works to be a thing of the past or be limited only to the analog world. If we 
take seriously the needs of “readers, viewers, listeners, watchers, builders and 
inhabitants,” as Jessica Litman has powerfully advocated, then the law needs 
to protect a space for both personal and other fair uses in the digital arena.170 
Although I do not think that all personal uses should be exempted from 
copyright enforcement, there must be some breathing room built into 
copyright law that protects self-expression, freedom of speech, historical 
documentation, cultural and intimate communication, and religious 
worship.171 Concerns over piracy are legitimate, but must be balanced with 
concerns over the harms that follow from what Lawrence Lessig has dubbed 
a “lock[ed] down culture.”172  
The current Register of Copyrights, Maria Pallante, has recognized that 
some of these “voluntary [DRM] initiatives” may be helpful in the 
enforcement of copyright.173 The Department of Commerce has 
“encourage[d] stakeholders to continue to work together to develop 
identification and filtering systems . . . .” However, the Department of 
Commerce importantly added that these efforts should be “consistent with 
rights to due process and free expression.”174 Unfortunately, thus far, the 
content industries are not proactively providing space for fair use online. 
Given the market failure in this arena and the importance of allowing 
individuals to engage with copyrighted works in a variety of ways in the 
digital space, statutory intervention may be necessary to assure that content 
providers respect the needs of their viewers, listeners, readers, and other 
creators. Revisions to the Copyright Act must engage with this tension, 
 
 169. See Rothman, supra note 76, at 472–73. 
 170. See Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1880 & passim (2007). 
Although I agree with Professor Litman’s overarching point, I have argued that the private-
public dimensions and commercial-noncommercial dimensions of the analysis should not 
determine whether uses are personal. See Rothman, supra note 76, at 472–74. 
 171. See generally Rothman, supra note 76 (promoting a liberty-based lens for copyright 
law and suggesting preferred categories of uses of copyrighted works). 
 172. Lessig, supra note 10. 
 173. Pallante, supra note 1, at 326. 
 174. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 67. 
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rather than avoid the issue and simply let the market take care of itself.175 
Given the underlying goals of promoting progress and incentivizing new 
works, as well as the important constitutionally protected values of free 
speech, liberty, and privacy, copyright law should build in protections for fair 
use. Content owners and providers should not be able to terminate fair use in 
the digital sphere. 
B. CONTRACTING AROUND COPYRIGHT 
Consumer contracts have augmented and expanded the lock-down world 
created by these technological measures. Nonnegotiable contracts of 
adhesion have become the standard way to disseminate copyrighted works 
on digital platforms. Most consumers never read these contracts (even when 
they click a box agreeing to the terms) and do not realize that the contracts 
fundamentally alter what they can do with copyrighted works. Many 
contracts prohibit sharing the work with other family members, reselling the 
work, using the underlying data, reverse-engineering, or making any other fair 
use of the work.176 All of these uses are otherwise expressly permitted by the 
Copyright Act.177 Even outside the mass-market context, parties have tried to 
secure rights through contracts that are broader than copyright provides.178 
Some of these contracts potentially create negative externalities for society 
and stand in opposition to the public-minded goals of copyright law.  
Courts have come to a variety of conclusions about the legitimacy and 
implications of these types of contracts. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, the 
Seventh Circuit upheld a shrinkwrap license provision that restricted the 
copying of uncopyrightable facts.179 Other courts and commentators have 
disagreed with the holding of ProCD in similar contexts.180 The question of 
 
 175. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of 
“Rights Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) (criticizing the Lochner-like approach to 
digital rights management and advocating for greater protection of broader “social welfare”). 
 176. See generally Viva R. Moffat, Super Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of 
Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 45 (2007) (recommending preemption as a 
solution to these pernicious adhesion contracts); Michael E. Kenneally, Commandeering 
Copyright, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1179 (2012) (examining and largely criticizing the 
widespread use of contracts to “reassign, on a massive scale, the entitlements initially 
assigned by copyright”). 
 177. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107, 109 (2012). 
 178. Cf. C.B.C. Dist. & Mktg. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077 
(E.D. Mo. 2006) (Major League Baseball sought unsuccessfully to enforce a contract 
provision that precluded the future right of C.B.C. to use players’ names and team names in 
a fantasy sports league), aff’d, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 179. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). A shrinkwrap license is 
one that is agreed to by opening the packaging of a product, often computer software. 
 180. See, e.g., Veeck v. Southern Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 
2002) (holding that a defendant could copy and distribute building codes despite license that 
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the validity of these contracts and, more broadly, contract provisions that 
exceed the limits of copyright law is still unresolved.  
The issue of what remedies are appropriate for breached copyright 
licenses is also unclear. In MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 
the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant who had violated a contract provision 
could be held liable for breach of contract, but not copyright infringement, 
because the violation was of a covenant, not a condition.181 The Ninth Circuit 
distinguished between conditions of licenses and covenants, holding that 
only a violation of the former could be held to infringe a copyright. The 
court, concerned about unreasonable expansions of copyright law to the 
detriment of the public, limited copyright infringement to violations of the 
contract that implicated one of the exclusive rights provided by copyright.182 
If an exclusive right provided for by copyright law was not violated, only a 
breach of contract claim would remain. How this rule will be applied in 
future cases and whether other courts should or will agree with the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis has not yet been resolved, and it may well be an issue that is 
better resolved legislatively than judicially. 
Another issue raised by contracts in the digital sphere is whether there is 
a digital first sale doctrine. The first sale doctrine offline permits purchasers 
of copyrighted works to sell or give those works to others.183 The question of 
whether this doctrine should translate to the digital world is contested. In the 
digital context, consumers often think they are purchasing works when they 
are instead only granted a license to use them. These licenses restrict the 
ability to transfer works. Courts have struggled with the question of whether 
licenses (particularly those distributed online) can limit the first sale doctrine. 
In Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., the Ninth Circuit rejected the idea of a digital first 
sale doctrine (at least where a license was involved) and held that the 
defendant was a licensee rather than the owner of computer software that he 
had purchased.184 In that decision, the Ninth Circuit left it to Congress to 
 
limited such uses); Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp, 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (holding clickwrap license unenforceable); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 
1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that shrinkwrap license did not form an enforceable contract); 
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04[B][3][a] (2014); 
Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995). 
 181. MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc.629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 182. Id. at 940–41. 
 183. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (holding that a copyright owner 
could not control the distribution right after a sale despite a notice in the front of the book 
that it could not be resold for less than one dollar). The Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill did 
not decide whether a license could be used instead of a sale to limit uses and preclude a 
transfer of ownership. At least some appellate courts think that such licenses would be 
permissible. See Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 184. Id.  
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address some of the broader policy questions at issue—both whether the 
first sale doctrine should be preserved in the digital environment and also 
whether licensing could be used to circumvent it.185 This treatment contrasts 
with recent decisions in the offline context. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
rejected a claim by the record labels that promotional CDs were only 
provided under a licensing regime and held that the recipients could transfer 
the CDs without infringing copyrights.186 Both the Department of 
Commerce and Register of Copyrights have recognized that the limitations 
on the first sale doctrine in the digital context require further study and 
review.187 Maria Pallante has suggested that “Congress may not want a 
copyright law where everything is licensed and nothing is owned.”188 The 
primary mechanism to prevent such a future is through copyright legislation. 
In sum, the vast control asserted by content providers through contracts 
and technology is growing and threatens the limiting principles of copyright 
law. Revisions to the copyright act must address these aspects of private 
ordering to prevent much of copyright’s public-minded framework from 
fading into the background. 
VI. LEARNING FROM PRIVATE ORDERING 
Private ordering can serve as a laboratory for the development of 
different approaches to addressing the challenges presented by copyright. 
Many use communities have developed a variety of norms and practices that 
suggest some common preferences for how people would like their creative 
works to be used. These norms have developed in the shadow of the law, but 
are not always driven by efforts to conform to the law or to limit legal 
exposure. Some of these privately generated understandings are 
uncontroversial and merit codification. At other times, private efforts 
jeopardize the delicate balance of our copyright ecosystem and their reach 
must be limited. 
In this final Part, I make some preliminary recommendations for 
addressing the issues raised by private ordering in the context of revisions to 
the formal law. I do not intend this section to provide a comprehensive list 
of preferred revisions to copyright law. Instead, I focus only on suggestions 
 
 185. Id. at 1115. 
 186. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding ownership transfer and applicability of first sale doctrine in the context of 
promotional CDs sent out by record labels that bore the message that only a license was 
being provided to the recipient). 
 187. See Pallante, supra note 1, at 331–32; Dep’t. of Commerce, supra note 4, at 35–38, 
101–02.  
 188. Pallante, supra note 1, at 331–32. 
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that address private ordering. I focus on three main categories of changes: 
first, those that seek to rein in the downsides of current private efforts; 
second, those that codify good ideas that have emerged from the private 
sector; and finally, those that address some of the unsettled or problematic 
areas of the current legal regime that have generated some of the private 
approaches. 
A. LIMITING THE EXCESSES OF PRIVATE ORDERING 
 Throughout this Article, I have identified specific areas of overreaching 
by private parties and various downsides of private ordering. I will provide 
some suggestions of how to limit these excesses. 
1. Limiting the Role of Customary Licensing, Fair Use Guidelines, and 
Alternative Licensing Schemes in Fair Use Evaluations 
The Copyright Act should continue to provide room for parties to 
license (regardless of whether such licensing is required), develop fair use 
guidelines (such as those put out by American University), and provide 
alternative licensing schemes (such as Creative Commons). However, the Act 
should carefully circumscribe the role of these private efforts to prevent 
them from altering copyright’s boundaries without robust public debate. The 
clearance culture in the publishing and film worlds should not influence 
courts’ independent analyses of whether particular uses are fair. Nor should a 
small cross-section of documentary filmmakers decide when fair use applies 
in that context. Creative Commons licenses can encourage the use of 
copyrighted works in ways that creators support, but the fact that a use 
breaches such a license should not weigh against a finding of fair use.  
One possible solution to these concerns is to add language to the fair use 
provision in § 107 that limits the consideration of such information when 
evaluating fair use. For example: “Private guidelines, contracts, and 
customary licensing practices should not be considered when analyzing 
whether a particular use is fair.” Additional language could clarify that courts 
may nevertheless consider the existence of a feasible and reasonably-priced 
licensing market as one among several considerations when evaluating 
market harm.189 
2. Adding Clarity about Contracts 
The question of whether clickwrap, browsewrap, or shrinkwrap licenses 
are enforceable remains open, as does the broader question of whether 
 
 189. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
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contracts can protect uncopyrightable aspects of works. Congress should 
revise the Copyright Act to address these and other vexing questions about 
contracts involving copyrighted works. Congress needs to provide parties 
and courts with greater guidance. 
There are a variety of ways to address these issues. One approach is to 
clarify the applicability of copyright preemption to overreaching contracts by 
revising § 301, the preemption provision of the current Act.190 Preemption, 
however, may be too blunt an instrument and may not be able to 
accommodate price discrimination on the basis of different types of uses.191 
The statute could also limit contract terms to prevent restrictions on the 
public domain. In the mid-1990s, Representative Rick Boucher suggested 
something along these lines and proposed that the following language be 
added to the Copyright Act: “When a work is distributed to the public 
subject to non-negotiable license terms,” the terms should not be enforced if 
they “limit the reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance or 
display” of uncopyrightable material (such as facts or ideas) or restrict fair 
use, the first sale doctrine, or other permissible uses provided for in sections 
107 through 114 and 117 and 118 of the Copyright Act.192 Although the 
suggestion died in committee when initially proposed,193 it is worth revisiting 
some of his suggestions.  
The Copyright Act could also clarify if (and when) violations of licensing 
arrangements involving copyrighted works can give rise to copyright-
infringement claims versus breach-of-contract claims. This would not only 
facilitate the protection of fair use zones, but also support uses of Creative 
Commons licenses by adding clarity and predictability for both creators who 
use the licenses and the licensees. 
3. Protecting a Fair Use Zone  
Absent statutory intervention, private efforts to expand copyright powers 
threaten to make formal copyright law and fair use largely irrelevant, at least 
in the digital space.194 Thus far, the market has been largely unwilling to 
 
 190. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). I note that § 301’s language is confusing and obscure, and 
more generally needs revising regardless of the issue of contracts. See Jennifer E. Rothman, 
Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 199, 225–36 (2002) 
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 191. Kenneally, supra note 176, at 1200. 
 192. Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997). 
 193. See Kenneally, supra note 176, at 1199–1200. 
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the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001) (suggesting that the DMCA 
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protect fair uses in the digital environment. Revisions to the Copyright Act 
should disrupt this trajectory.  
Fair use is not an evil to be tolerated, but something that sits at the heart 
of copyright’s underlying objectives. Congress should add an explicit fair use 
zone to the statute: the Act should specifically require that TPM and DRM 
provide breathing room for fair use; content identification systems must 
provide latitude for fair use. Contracts should also be prohibited from 
restricting fair uses of copyrighted works or the use of uncopyrightable 
aspects of those works. 
Congress should also facilitate fair uses by codifying and expanding the 
exemptions to the DMCA anti-circumvention provision. At the very least, 
the statute should codify exemptions that have repeatedly been renewed 
(such as the exemptions for educators and documentary filmmakers). Ideally, 
the exemptions would be broader than they currently are and allow 
circumvention for fair uses in derivative works, regardless of whether those 
works are commercial.  
B. NORMS WORTH CODIFYING 
There are a variety of areas in which private ordering suggests 
appropriate approaches that deserve codification. I will focus on three of 
these norms—faculty ownership of scholarship and course materials, 
alternative licensing mechanisms, and attribution. 
1. Faculty Ownership of Scholarship and Course Materials 
Most, though not all, universities have adopted explicit policies vesting 
ownership of copyrighted works in the faculty. Universities that have not 
explicitly adopted such policies still usually conform to a long-standing 
custom of allowing faculty to retain copyright ownership over their 
scholarship and course materials.195 University policy statements often justify 
the academic copyright regime by referring to “established academic 
 
“has killed” copyright as we know it by discarding copyright’s focus on the promotion of the 
public interest). 
 195. See, e.g., HARVARD UNIV., OFFICE OF TECH. DEV., STATEMENT OF POLICY IN 
REGARD TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2013), available at http://otd.harvard.edu/ 
resources/policies/IP/ [hereinafter Harvard IP Policy]; UNIV. OF CAL., OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA POLICY ON COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP (1992), 
available at http://policy.ucop.edu/doc/2100003/CopyrightOwnership/ [hereinafter U.C. 
Ownership Policy]; Virginia Policy, supra note 101; WASH. UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS, COMPLIANCE 
& POLICIES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY (2013), available at 
http://wustl.edu/policies/intelprop.html. 
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traditions.”196 In part because of the reliance on customary practices regarding 
copyright ownership, some universities treat computer software copyrights 
differently than other scholarly works.197  
These policies and practices, however, do not generally meet the 
requirements of § 201 of the Copyright Act, which requires that any 
exception from the work-for-hire rules be set forth in a writing signed by 
both parties.198 If copyrighted works by faculty are viewed as prepared in the 
scope of employment (not an uncommon conclusion), then “unless the 
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by 
them,” the university should own most works produced by faculty under 
current copyright law.199 There is little dispute that university faculty members 
who produce scholarly books and articles are fulfilling expected job tasks. 
One could, however, argue that the works are not prepared “at the direction” 
of the employer since professors determine the subjects on which they write 
as well as the content of the works.  
Even though these university policies do not meet the statutory 
requirements set forth in § 201, several courts have pointed to the customary 
“faculty exception,” which places authorship in the hands of the university 
faculty, as a basis to give disputed copyrights to faculty rather than 
 
 196. 1983 NYU Policy, supra note 104 (emphasis added); see also YALE UNIV., OFFICE OF 
COOPERATIVE RESEARCH, YALE UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT POLICY (2014), available at 
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generally disclaim ownership of traditional copyrightable materials created by a faculty 
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to faculty for their scholarly and aesthetic copyrighted works”) (emphasis added); see also 
UNIV. OF CHICAGO, IT SERVICES, IT POLICIES, NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND 
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(“By long-established practice, individual faculty members enjoy the royalties on any book 
that they write . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
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computer software). 
 198. The work-for-hire doctrine vests ownership of works of authorship in an employer 
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direction of the employer. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2012); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737–51 (1989). 
 199. See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2012). 
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universities.200 To address the potential conflict between these widely 
accepted norms and § 201, Congress should add a specific provision to 
clarify that works produced by university and college faculty are not works 
for hire. It would also be appropriate to extend such a provision to educators 
more generally (such as elementary and secondary school teachers) and to 
original classroom materials and lectures, as well as scholarship. There is 
widespread agreement in this area and the law should settle the matter to 
avoid further uncertainty and litigation. 
2. À La Carte Copyright 
The Copyright Office could also learn from the success of Creative 
Commons.201 The Office could allow copyright registrants to opt for Creative 
Commons licenses at the time of registration and could add this information 
to a searchable online database. The Office could go even further and allow 
parties to tailor copyright to their needs; for example, the Office could add 
checkboxes to registration forms allowing creators to opt out of or into 
certain preferences. Possible choices could be allowing all educational uses 
with attribution (without permission or payment), or donating the work to 
the public domain after twenty-five years. The current Register of Copyrights 
has expressed, at least in principle, a willingness to consider some alternative 
licensing arrangements.202 The Creative Commons approach provides one 
possible approach for how the Office could do this. The alternative licensing 
approach would work best if potential users could easily search licenses and 
registrations online.203  
 
 200. See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1988) (describing 
the “universal assumption and practice” that academic writing belongs to the teacher not to 
the university, and concluding that if forced to decide whether the 1976 Act abolished the 
teacher exception, the court would hold “that the exception had survived”); Weinstein v. 
Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094–95 (7th Cir. 1987) (describing the tradition of faculty 
ownership of copyrights in works); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the 
Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 590, 597–98 (1987); cf. Shaul v. Cherry Valley-
Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2004) (suggesting that the faculty 
exception after the 1976 revisions may be limited to circumstances in which the university 
has written a policy so indicating). But see Pittsburg State Univ. Kan. Nat’l Ed. Ass’n v. Kan. 
Bd. of Regents, 122 P.3d 336, 345–46 (2005) (concluding that the teacher exception did not 
survive the 1976 revision); Forasté v. Brown Univ., 290 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239 n.5 (D.R.I. 
2003) (same). 
 201. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 202. Pallante, supra note 1, at 333–35. 
 203. The government has begun to recognize that it needs to improve the searchability 
of its copyright records. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 90; Pallante, supra note 1, 
at 343; Pamela Samuelson et al., The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for Reform, 25 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1175, 1203 (2010). 
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3. Attribution Norms 
With the exception of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, which 
confers a right of attribution on creators of visual art, U.S. copyright law 
does not require attribution.204 Nevertheless, many norms in the copyright 
world favor providing authors with attribution. Attribution is by far the 
most-often-sought provision of the Creative Commons licenses. This 
preference was so ubiquitous that it is now included in all Creative Commons 
licenses.205 Other use communities, such as fan fiction communities, chefs, 
and authors, when asked and in practice all seek and often follow norms of 
attribution.206 Many of American University’s best practices statements and 
codes require that attribution be provided when uses are made and 
attribution is feasible.207  
The preference for attribution is not contested. Providing some 
recognition of this preference may be an appropriate place for legislation. 
Although a failure to provide attribution should never be dispositive of 
infringement and attribution may be infeasible in a variety of circumstances, 
it certainly is worth putting a thumb on the scale in the statute in favor of 
attribution. One possible way of doing this (perhaps the best way) is to 
explicitly add attribution as a consideration in the fair use analysis.  
C. CLARIFYING FAIR USE AND ADDING SAFE HARBORS 
The main driving force behind many of the practices that I have 
discussed is the uncertainty and anxiety about relying on the fair use defense. 
These concerns are the impetus behind the clearance culture and litigation-
avoidance customs that I discussed in Part II, as well as the Classroom 
Guidelines and Best Practices Statements that I discussed in Part III. Some 
have argued that these private approaches are sufficient remedies for the 
unpredictability and expense of fair use litigation. I disagree. Our system does 
 
 204. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012). Not only is visual art narrowly defined, but the right 
can also be waived. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A(e)(1) (2012). 
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not work if people are afraid to invoke fair use or if a plethora of alternative 
guidelines suggest different and contradictory boundaries of fair use. Fair use 
is not only a remedy for market failure, but also an important part of the 
copyright balance. Fair use serves to further the express constitutional 
directive of the copyright system to “promote the Progress of Science,”208 
and it deserves additional support and clarity. I suggest four ways that the 
Act could better support the assertion of fair use: 
1. Revising Fair Use Factors and § 107 
Even though I do not think that major revisions to the fair use factors 
are required or wise, some minor revisions to § 107 could be helpful. As I 
suggested earlier in subsection VI.A.1, a provision in the statute should state 
that the mere fact that licensing is customary or that the use exceeds a private 
guideline’s directives should not weigh against fair use, nor should 
conformity with those practices or guidelines automatically establish fair use.  
Several other changes might lend greater clarity to the fair use provision 
and thereby disincentivize various practices that have burgeoned in the face 
of uncertainty. It would be useful, for example, to add transformativeness as 
an express consideration to the first fair use factor—the purpose and 
character of the use. Transformativeness is a consideration in fair use analysis 
that developed after the passage of the statutory fair use provision as part of 
the 1976 Copyright Act. Transformativeness focuses on whether the user has 
fundamentally changed, in other words “transformed,” the copyrighted work.  
To provide greater guidance, the statute should clarify whether a different 
purpose counts as a transformative use or if only a fundamental alteration to 
the underlying work can be transformative.209 For example, in Bill Graham 
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., the Second Circuit held that the use of an 
unaltered Grateful Dead poster in a biography of the band was 
transformative because the poster was used for a very different purpose than 
that for which it was created.210 Other courts, however, have concluded that 
unaltered photographs are not transformative even if they are used for a 
different purpose than the originals.211 I think a transformative purpose 
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should often weigh in favor of fair use and would prefer codification of the 
more generous interpretation of transformativeness;212 however, regardless of 
which approach is taken, some guidance on the distinction would be useful.  
Other possible revisions to the fair use provision include adding more 
categories of preferred uses to the preamble of the section. Currently, the 
preamble sets forth preferred categories of uses—e.g., “criticism, comment, 
news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship[, and] research.”213 It would be 
helpful to explicitly prefer uses of copyrighted works that are incidentally 
captured during filming or recording, that are used to depict historical or 
current events, and that are used in religious worship.214 As I will discuss, a 
safe harbor for such uses may work better than adding these considerations 
to fair use, but enumerating them in § 107 is also a potential option. 
2. Creating Additional Safe Harbors 
Even though I am skeptical that the fair use statute can be drafted with 
greater clarity without losing some of the advantages of its breadth and 
flexibility, the addition of some new safe harbors might help to facilitate the 
assertion of fair use. Congress should add additional safe harbors for 
particularly affected and worthy use communities, such as educators, 
students, libraries, documentary filmmakers, and news gatherers. Although 
the preamble to § 107 expressly prefers many of these categories and libraries 
already have some protections pursuant to § 108, some additional protections 
would help promote reasonable uses of copyrighted works. Any such 
additional safe harbors should explicitly indicate that they do not narrow or 
limit the fair use protections of § 107, as has been done in § 108.215 An 
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Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198–200 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that two-minute previews of copyright 
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new material added); Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 
142–43 (2d Cir. 1998) (declaring any transformative component of a book of trivia based on 
the Seinfeld television series as “slight to non-existent”). 
 212. Rothman, supra note 76, at 490–93. Cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair 
Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that 
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exemption for incidental uses of copyrighted works would be particularly 
useful. Works that are captured during the filming of documentaries or news 
reporting and are being used as part of this documentation of reality should 
be exempted from liability for copyright infringement. Congress should also 
provide an exemption for the use of religious texts for purposes of 
worship.216 
Congress also should develop a revised set of Classroom Guidelines, 
developed with greater input from faculty, students, and libraries. The 
revision should be expressly adopted as a safe harbor for certain educational 
uses of materials. Such a provision should address many of the current 
challenges in this arena, including the use of orphan works and online course 
reserves.217  
3. Limiting the Scope of Statutory Damages 
One of the primary ways to support assertions of fair use is to protect 
against the exposure to massive statutory damages (and potentially criminal 
liability) for reasonably, but wrongly, assessing whether a particular use is 
fair.218 As discussed, it is sometimes difficult to predict fair use (especially in 
gray areas) and many individuals and smaller businesses may not be able to 
pay for legal-opinion letters that would insulate them from findings of 
willfulness for uses of copyrighted materials. Such a finding of willfulness 
would put infringers into the higher statutory damages category and expose 
them to criminal penalties.  
Courts currently have the discretion to reduce statutory damages if an 
infringer proves that she “was not aware and had no reason to believe 
that . . . her acts constituted an infringement.”219 However, the broader 
remittance provision, which applies when there are “reasonable grounds for 
believing” that a use was fair, only applies to employees or agents of 
nonprofit educational institutions, libraries, and archives (or those 
institutions themselves), and, in more limited circumstances, to public 
 
Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d 445, 456–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting plaintiff’s 
argument that library could not assert a fair use defense because of the more specific § 108 
that governs library usage). 
 216. Rothman, supra note 76, at 526–28 (discussing the need to use copyrighted 
religious texts for worship). 
 217. Maria Pallante has also observed the need for renewed attention to creating some 
safe harbors for higher education. See Pallante, supra note 1, at 333; see also DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, supra note 4, at 3 (suggesting that the § 108 library exception needs updating). 
 218. Cf. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A 
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439 (2009) (criticizing the current system 
of statutory damages and suggesting a variety of judicial and legislative reforms). 
 219. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2012). 
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broadcasters.220 Congress could expand this fair use remittance provision or 
at least provide some guaranteed—rather than discretionary—reduction in 
statutory damages for reasonable but erroneous fair use assessments by 
others. Only the most culpable actors, such as those engaged in large-scale 
piracy, should be subject to high statutory damages and criminal liability,221 
not those who have tried to stay on the right side of the law. 
If an average person wrongly though reasonably assesses her chances of 
having a successful fair use defense, she should not have to pay wildly more 
than a reasonable licensing fee plus some fine.222 The statutory damages 
should be sufficient to discourage unlawful copying and to incentivize 
copyright enforcement, but should not be so massive that they discourage 
future reasonable assertions of fair use.  
It would also be helpful to clarify that a failure to conform to customary 
licensing or clearance practices cannot form a basis of a willfulness finding 
for purposes of assessing statutory damages or criminal liability. The 
Copyright Office’s recent effort to provide an accessible database of fair use 
decisions also may facilitate the ability of parties who cannot afford legal 
counsel to make reasonable assessments of fair use that could insulate them 
from findings of willful infringement.223  
4. Creating a Personal-Use Exemption or Preference 
The copyright system needs some public buy-in to work. Public support 
requires people to think that on some level copyright law is fair. When 
copyright law is wildly out of sync with community practices, there may be 
value in interpreting copyright to conform to those understandings or, better 
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 222. For examples of recent large statutory-damage awards against individual infringers, 
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yet, amending the Copyright Act to reflect some of those norms. It may be 
appropriate to adopt some sort of exemption or fair use preference for 
limited personal uses. Not only has the public become accustomed to 
personal uses, but there are also compelling normative reasons to allow such 
uses. Personal uses promote self-expression, self-development, identify-
formation, communication, and intimacy.224 Enforcing copyright against 
personal uses also often conflicts with our privacy values and the important 
goal of providing some surveillance-free zones.225 When drafting a personal 
use exemption, Congress should focus on the motivation of the use and the 
likely substitutionary (or nonsubstitutionary) impact of the use. Whether the 
use is noncommercial or private should not be determinative.226 If a parent 
puts up a video on YouTube of her child singing Let It Go from Disney’s hit 
movie, Frozen, this is a public and potentially commercial use (advertising 
revenue could potentially stream to the parent and, of course, to YouTube). 
Nevertheless, this sort of use is motivated by an interest in sharing a real-
world event and a parent’s enjoyment of her child’s singing. The use is not 
likely to substitute for the original work—particularly if it was recorded with 
the likely background noise of a chaotic household and is tied to the video 
image. The fact that the posting is public and potentially revenue-generating 
should not alter the analysis that this is a personal use.227 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As I have previously noted in the context of reliance on customary 
practices in intellectual property, “[l]eft unchecked, customary practices 
threaten to swallow up IP law, and replace it with industry-led IP regimes 
that give the public and other creators more limited rights to access and use 
intellectual property” than were envisioned by the Constitution and 
Congress.228 In copyright, these practices and other forms of private 
ordering, such as technological controls and contracts, are altering the 
boundaries of de facto copyright law every day. Some of these private efforts 
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are beneficial, but others threaten our ability to engage with copyrighted 
works.  
Congress must confront private ordering as it revises the Copyright Act. 
Although copyright law should continue to provide breathing room for 
private experimentation, it cannot turn a blind eye to the negative 
consequences that flow from some forms of private ordering. Copyright law 
must prevent the lock-in of these alternative regimes and practices, and limit 
the extent to which parties can extend copyright law through burdensome 
private agreements and technologies that obliterate fair use. Codification of 
some of the widely accepted and uncontroversial insights of copyright’s 
private ordering also would lend greater clarity and public support to the 
copyright regime. As we look forward to a Copyright Act for the twenty-first 
century, Congress must not only consider the interests of large content 
providers, but also those of the broader public. The Next Great Copyright 
Act must find ways to not only limit online piracy, but also to protect the 
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